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Economics and the Environment:
Trading Debt and Technology
for Nature
Catherine A. O'Neill*
Cass R. Sunstein**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the theory and practice of environmental
protection have begun to incorporate principles of economics.
New initiatives have attempted to protect natural resources while
promoting economic development or at least minimizing adverse
economic effects. Indeed, a staple of the recent movement for
environmental reform has been attention to the costs and the un-
intended perverse effects of environmental regulation. It has
been shown, for example, that centralized command-and-control
regulation can discourage innovation in pollution control, in-
crease rather than decrease pollution levels, freeze existing tech-
nology, and produce serious inefficiencies in the form of
unnecessarily high costs.'
Understandings of this sort have led environmental reformers
close to the principle of Pareto superiority, encompassed in strat-
egies that can make people better off without making anyone
worse off,2 or at least anyone who has a basis for legitimate com-
plaint. Thus, for example, systems in which polluters pay for the
harms they cause, and are permitted to purchase and sell the re-
sulting permits, are preferable to the currently pervasive "best
* Ford Foundation Graduate Fellow in Public International Law, Harvard Law School.
** Karl N. Llewellyn Professor ofJurisprudence, Law School and Department of Polit-
ical Science, University of Chicago. The authors are grateful to the World Wildlife Fund
and to the International Institute for Energy Conservation for invaluable assistance, and to
Anne-Marie Burley, Abram Chayes, Martin Loesch, John H. Robinson, and Craig Scott for
helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See Ralph Turvey, On Divergence Between the Social Costs and Private Costs, in ECONOMICS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 187-91 (Robert Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 1977); Allen V.
Kneese & Blair T. Bower, Standards, Changes and Equity, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra, at 217-28; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12-14 (1986).
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available technology" requirements along every possible dimen-
sion of social welfare.3 The general use of the principle that "pol-
luters pay," combined with other decentralized, incentive-based
strategies, holds out far more promise for environmental reform
than the technology-based strategies of the last two decades.
Similar debates have begun to arise in the international arena,
which promises to be the focal point for environmental policy in
the next generation. Some people have suggested, for example,
that the greenhouse effect 4 and the destruction of the ozone
layer 5 might be controlled through the imposition, by treaty, of
uniform technological requirements on sources of environmental
pollutants, or of strict emissions -limits laid down in advance by
some international body. 6 Protection of endangered species
might involve the adoption by'all nations of uniform measures for
controlling action threatening to endangered populations. 7 In-
deed, there has been considerable movement in these directions,
as nations start to develop coordinated strategies for handling
what are, after all, global problems.8
I At first glance there seems much to be said on behalf of uni-
form strategies for handling international environmental
problems. Since such strategies appear to treat everyone alike,
they seem to have the important virtues of ease of application and
3. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 172.
4. This phenomenon, sometimes described as global warming, is produced by accumu-
lation of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere. See JOHN FIROR, THE CHANG-
ING ATMOSPHERE: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 49-55 (1990); MICHAEL OPPENHEIMER & ROBERT
H. BOYLE, DEAD HEAT: THE RACE AGAINST THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 22-33 (1989).
5. This phenomenon is produced mostly by chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons
("CFCs"). See FIROR, supra note 4, at 26-43.
6. International efforts and proposals to date have generally favored uniform require-
ments. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) (calling for phasing out CFC pro-
duction). Some international agreements, however, are beginning to make some provision
for the situation of developing countries, by permitting at least a longer time period within
which those countries must meet specific levels or standards. See, e.g., id. art. 5, 26 I.L.M.
at 1555-56.
7. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into forceJuly 1, 1975).
8. See generally Hilary F. French, Strengthening Global Environmental Governance, in STATE OF
THE WORLD 1992, at 155 (Lester R. Brown ed., Worldwatch Institute 1992). See also the
discussion of efforts toward worldwide reduction targets for carbon dioxide, in UNCED
Meeting, Ozone-Depleting Substances Top Environmental Agenda for 1992, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA) 54 (Jan. 29, 1992). Negotiations are currently underway for proposed international
agreements on forestry, biodiversity, and climate change, in conjunction with the June
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
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general equity. But there are enormous disparities among na-
tions in terms of standard of living, patterns of consumption, and
past contribution to present problems. Differences exist as well
in natural resource endowments, in technological capacities, and
in social and cultural values.
In view of these differences, international solutions that impose
uniform obligations are both inefficient and unjust. Uniform reg-
ulations are likely to impose costs far in excess of those necessary
to achieve the relevant goals and even to frustrate achievement of
these goals. 9 Such regulations also confer disproportionate bene-
fits on nations that have gained from their existing contributions
to current problems, and they impose disproportionate burdens
on nations that have the least to lose from increased environmen-
tal degradation. It should be unsurprising that poor countries
have been especially reluctant to enter into agreements that seem
to intrude on their sovereignty while imposing costs that dwarf
the potential benefits.' 0
In both developing and industrialized nations, any strategy
designed to address global environmental problems must at the
same time confront the issues of poverty and economic develop-
ment, which often seem to make environmental protection a lux-
ury that most nations cannot afford. Until recently, these tandem
concerns have been compartmentalized and considered sepa-
rately by agencies and institutions charged with one mission or
the other." There is an emerging consensus that recognition of
9. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 173-75; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Sub-
stance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627-31.
10. See French, supra note 8, at 160-61 (noting that the fund to help developing coun-
tries make the transition to CFC substitutes was central to treaty on ozone depletion, the
Montreal Protocol).
11. In the mid-1980s, some international development institutions were instructed to
consider the environmental impact of the decisions they made within their discrete area of
competence. But environmental and economic concerns were still largely treated as dis-
tinct. Initiatives by international environmental entities, too, have only recently begun to
reflect the connection between the issues of environment and development. In May, 1987,
for example, the President of the World Bank announced that the World Bank would ad-
dress the environmental aspects of development projects. Shortly thereafter, the World
Bank undertook internal restructuring, including the creation of a central Environmental
Department, designed to increase the integration of environmental considerations in all
stages of project financing. More recently, the World Bank has indicated that environmen-
tal impact assessment statements will become a standard requirement of project proposals.
See generally Darryl Joannides, Note, Restructuring the World Bank: The Environmental Light
Shines on the Funding of Development Projects, 2 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 161 (1989). More-
over, governmental development assistance efforts have recently strengthened their re-
1992]
96 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:93
the global nature of environmental problems necessarily entails
recognition of the global nature of the problems of poverty and
development.1 2 While this theoretical consensus is important, in-
ternational policy has yet to reflect the interrelation between envi-
ronment and development. The challenge for international
cooperative efforts is to put this recognition into practice.
The rallying cry of "sustainability"' 3 is a shorthand description
of the need to integrate considerations of environmental quality
and economic development. The underlying goal of sus-
tainability is Paretian in character: the simultaneous improvement
of the welfare of multiple groups and interests, including those of
future generations.
Nowhere is there a greater need to adopt sustainability and
Paretianism as guiding maxims for policy than for those environ-
mental issues that involve the interests of both developed and de-
veloping countries. It is clear that countries of the Third World
must be free to pursue development and improve prospects for
economic health and self-determination. In order to reduce pov-
erty and unemployment, and to eliminate the large international
debt burden under which many developing countries now oper-
ate, new productive arrangements are indispensable. Equally
clear, however, is the need for growth to be undertaken in an eco-
logically prudent manner, that is, in a manner appreciative of the
fact that neither economic nor environmental health can be real-
ized in isolation.
quirement of environmental impact assessments. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
NATURAL ENDOWMENTS: FINANCING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT § 2.1, at
5-6 (International Conservation Financing Project Report 1989) [hereinafter NATURAL EN-
DOWMENTS].
Development assistance agencies rely primarily upon economists and engineers for pro-
ject preparation. In the past environmental concerns often received attention as an after-
thought. See id. at 6. Thus, despite international policy guidelines, "[tihere is still a
potentially dangerous tendency within many of these institutions to compartmentalize en-
vironmental issues, and, in effect, treat them as peripheral to crucial macroeconomic ad-
justment issues when, in many developing countries, they are indeed central." Id. at 21.
12. Consider, for example, the embodiment of this recognition through the inclusion,
in 1992, of development among the aims of the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development; its predecessor, the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, declined to take this step in 1972. See infra note 171. See aso H. Jeffrey
Leonard & David Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A Political
Perspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281 (1981).
13. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
8-9 (1987); LESTER R. BROWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY (1981).
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Ecological prudence did not, of course, characterize the meth-
ods by which developed nations achieved economic growth and
prominence during the industrial revolution; nor does it charac-
terize the consumption patterns of most of the developed world
today. It is a hard question whether and to what extent the indus-
trialized nations are now obligated to their less-developed coun-
terparts for having produced global environmental degradation,
but it is clear that in their future development, all nations must
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past.
In recent years, the "debt-for-nature" swap has become a
prominent strategy for solving environmental problems within
the frameworks of sustainability and Paretianism. Broadly speak-
ing, debt-for-nature swaps are designed to stem the exploitation
of natural resources in developing nations without ignoring eco-
nomic needs in those nations.14 Their chief virtue is that they
confer economic benefits while promoting environmental goals.
But it is necessary to develop more ambitious arrangements for
achieving environmental quality and economic growth.
In this Article we have two goals. The first is to explore and
suggest improvements in current debt-for-nature swaps, with the
ultimate aim of defending the use of economic incentives and
Paretian principles in the context of international environmental
policy. The second is to examine some of the limitations of the
exchange of debt for nature, and thus to suggest an alternative
exchange that overcomes those limitations. The exchange we en-
vision is quite simple. Developed nations would transfer 15 to de-
veloping nations environmentally advanced technologies,
particularly technologies designed to increase efficient energy use
or to replace non-renewable sources with renewable sources of
energy. In return, developing nations would agree to provide a
measure of environmental protection.
14. A generic formulation requires this level of generality. As will be discussed, a broad
spectrum of arrangements have been or could be fashioned. In particular, the vagueness
of the phrase "without ignoring their economic needs" is warranted because some arrange-
ments merely refrain from exacerbating the underdeveloped condition of the nation's
economy while others could actually advance, to varying degrees, the development of the
nation.
15. The term "transfer" is employed loosely to refer to a number of arrangements,
ranging from donation to cooperation, the best among which would be those that involve
joint research efforts enhancing the developing nation's capacity to conduct independent
research and achieve technical self-reliance.
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In Part II of this Article, we outline the concerns, both ecologi-
cal and economic, that lead to the creation of debt-for-nature
swaps. In Part III, after detailing the mechanics of such swaps, we
discuss various objections to these exchanges and examine poten-
tial limitations on their usefulness. In Part IV, we discuss the cur-
rent possibilities for the implementation of technologies for the
efficient use of energy and for the development of renewable
sources of energy. We then propose an exchange of such tech-
nologies for nature and note several considerations that will bear
upon the structuring of such trades.
We conclude that trades of energy technology for nature have
significant advantages over debt-for-nature swaps. Trades that
involve technology hold out the best long-term promise for help-
ing both developing and industrialized nations to promote eco-
nomic development, to protect the environment, and to bring
about an equitable international sharing of the burdens imposed
by both of these imperatives.
II. PROBLEMS GIVING RISE TO DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
We begin by describing the pressures that have made ex-
changes of debt for nature so attractive to a seemingly disparate
array of parties. These pressures include extreme stresses on the
natural resources of developing countries - stresses that have
created environmental risks for those countries and for the world
as a whole - and mounting international debt.
A. Environmental Concerns
The immediate need for economic progress in developing
countries has led to severe environmental degradation. A major
problem is deforestation. The razing of the world's rain forests
continues at an alarming rate. In 1990 alone, seventeen million
hectares of tropical forest were destroyed.' 6 Only half of the
world's mature tropical forests still exist. 17
Eighty percent of the forests of the Philippine archipelago have
been destroyed; Haiti, India, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Ghana, Nige-
ria, and Bangladesh have lost all or nearly all of their primary rain
16. John C. Ryan, Conserving Biological Diversity, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1992, supra note
8, at 9, 10.
17. GEOFFREY LEAN ET AL., ATLAS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 65 (1990).
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forest; Honduras will have lost more than half by the year 2000.18
Latin America has lost thirty-seven percent of its tropical forests
and Africa has lost fifty-two percent.' 9 If the current rate of net
deforestation persists, the world will lose an area more than half
the size of the continental United States by the year 2030,20 and
tropical forests will be virtually eliminated within the next eighty-
five years. 2 '
Many developing country governments have actively en-
couraged colonization of rain forests to relieve population pres-
sures, distribute land to the poor, and promote development. A
particularly revealing example is the policy of the Amazonas gov-
ernment to issue free chain saws to colonizers. 22 Expenditure
and taxing policies have encouraged deforestation in the Amazon
region and elsewhere in the developing world.23 An estimated $1
billion worth of timber was burned in the Brazilian Amazon in a
single year, in part stimulated by government policies such as
subsidizing cattle ranches. 24
The environmental consequences of deforestation are complex,
but there can be no doubt that the consequences are potentially
great. Some of these effects are immediately observable; others
depend upon poorly understood ecological, geographical, and
temporal interrelationships. It is clear, for example, that defores-
tation threatens genetic diversity. The rain forests are an ex-
traordinary source of species of animals and plants, holding at
18. d. at 65-67.
19. Id. at 65.
20. See Lester R. Brown et al., Picturing a Sustainable Society, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1990,
at 173, 184 (Lester R. Brown ed., Worldwatch Institute 1990).
21. JOSE GOLDEMBERG ET AL., ENERGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD 40 (1988).
22. See Michel Bird, But Will Amazon Jungle Survive the Onslaught, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL,
Nov. 15, 1989, at A7.
23. See generally MALCOLM GILLIS & ROBERT REPETrO, DEFORESTATION AND GOVERNMENT
POLICY (1988).
24. See NATURAL ENDOWMENTS, supra note 11, at 18 n.26. See also WORLD BANK, WORLD*
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, at 59, Box 4.1 (1990) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 1990]. Note that new governmental policies have in turn played a major role in
lowering the rate of destruction of the rain forest in Brazil. The recent elimination of most
of the tax credits encouraging deforestation has contributed to the decline in deforestation
in the Brazilian Amazon from 8 million hectares in 1987 to 3 million hectares in 1989.
Although the 1989 figure may be explained in part by the unusual amount of rainfall dur-
ing the dry season (during which most of the burning takes place) and by increased en-
forcement efforts against illegal burning, the dismantling of financial incentives appears to
have contributed significantly to the fairly rapid change in trends. See Sandra Postel &
Christopher Flavin, Reshaping the Global Economy, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1991, at 178 (Les-
ter R. Brown ed., Worldwatch Institute 1991).
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least half of the earth's species despite occupying only six percent
of its land area. 25 A single volcano in the Philippines has more
kinds of woody plants than all of the United States. 26 Elimination
of species may in turn have a variety of harmful effects, including
the reduction of available genetic stock for development of
medicines and wild strains that reduce plant disease. The medici-
nal and agricultural losses could be both enormous and irrevers-
ible. This is a concern quite independent of the possible ethical
obligation of one species not to produce wholesale extinctions of
others, or to contribute to massive deaths of other living
creatures.
Deforestation contributes to the problem of climate change in
several ways. The most obvious impact, caused by the very act of
felling and burning trees, is the release of carbon directly into the
atmosphere. Recent estimates attribute the release of one to two
billion tons of carbon per year to deforestation.2 7 By comparison,
in 1988, the combustion of fossil fuels released 5.66 billion tons
of carbon into the atmosphere. 28 Although developing countries
use fossil fuels at a much lower rate than do their industrialized
counterparts, their contribution to the world's total carbon emis-
sions is significant. Deforestation in Brazil alone accounts for the
release of 336 million tons of carbon annually.29 This amount is
nearly six times its contribution of carbon from fossil fuel com-
bustion. The combination of these two sources, however, makes
Brazil the fourth largest carbon emitter in the world.30 Deforesta-
tion also accounts for Indonesia's and Colombia's place among
the world's ten largest carbon emitters. 3 l
In addition to the direct release of carbon into the atmosphere,
large-scale deforestation contributes to perturbations in the
global carbon cycle and ultimately to the risk of climate change.
Destruction of trees eliminates a major source of carbon uptake,
because trees act as a natural "sink" that absorbs carbon rather
25. Edward 0. Wilson, Threats to Biodiversity, in MANAGING PLANET EARTH 49, 51 (1990).
26. LEAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 68.
27. See Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1990, supra
note 20, at 17, 18.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 20-21 & Table 2-2.
30. Id. at 20-21.
31. Id.
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than allowing it to move into the atmosphere.32 Other distur-
bances, more difficult to quantify, also result from deforestation.
Changes in terrain reflectivity after forests have been cleared af-
fect the hydrological cycle, producing variations in precipitation,
evaporation, and runoff. These changes may in turn have effects
on atmospheric circulation and climate.3"
The destruction of protective forest cover also threatens to in-
crease soil erosion, undermining the capacity of the land to sup-
port agricultural and other productive uses. As a consequence of
deforestation and the resulting soil erosion, an estimated one-
tenth of the world's crop lands - an area equivalent to the size of
the United States - can no longer sustain cultivation.3 4 In addi-
tion, increased runoff clogs water systems with silt, and produces
flooding in some areas. s 5 Soil erosion may lead, in the extreme,
to desertification. According to United Nations Environment
Programme estimates, worldwide losses in agricultural produc-
tion from desertification total $26 billion per year.36
Deforestation is hardly the only relevant environmental con-
cern for developing nations. Economic development in such na-
tions depends in large part on the use of energy, and much of the
global increase in energy use will come from this part of the
world.3 7 If developing countries need and use the energy sources
characteristic of industrialized nations, the environmental conse-
quences will be enormous.38 Carbon dioxide emissions from de-
veloping countries are currently increasing at a rate of six percent
per year. By contrast, in Western Europe and North America, the
32. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT 7-18 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 1990) (technical discussion of car-
bon flux, the effects of various carbon emissions on the carbon cycle, and their contribu-
tion to the risk of climate change) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT].
33. Id. at xxxii.
34. Lester R. Brown & Edward C. Wolf, Reclaiming the Future, in STATE OF THE WORLD
1988, at 170, 174 (Lester R. Brown ed., Worldwatch Institute 1988).
35. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 40.
36. See NATURAL ENDOWMENTS, supra note 11, at 2 (citing YUSUF J. AHMAD & MOHAMED
KAsSAS, DESERTIFICATION: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE BIOSPHERE (1987)).
37. See Christopher Flavin, Building a Bridge to Sustainable Energy, in STATE OF THE WORLD
1992, supra note 8, at 27, 30.
38. The consumption pattern of the industrialized world, which accounts for 1 of global
energy use, is carbon intensive. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 22. In Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") countries in 1989, for exam-
ple, fossil fuels contributed 84.5% to total primary energy consumption. Calculation
based on BRrIsSH PETROLEUM COMPANY, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 34
(June 1990).
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rate of increase of carbon dioxide emissions fell from about three
percent per year in the period 1945 to 1972, to less than one per-
cent per year in the period 1973 to 1984. 39 By 2010, the develop-
ing world might well account for half of the world's carbon
emissions .40
In absolute terms, fossil fuel combustion still occurs in rela-
tively small amounts in developing countries, but it is increas-
ing.41 China is now the world's third largest source of carbon
emissions, and it will soon surpass the status of the former Soviet
Union.42 Even if developing countries sought only to engage in
existing carbon-emitting activities, their growing populations
would require substantial increases in the amount of carbon emit-
ted.43 Efforts to achieve economic growth have typically required
increased energy consumption, and thus greater levels of carbon
emissions. 44 The combustion of fossil fuels contributes not only
to the greenhouse effect, but also to a wide range of other pollu-
tion problems, including acid deposition, which damages crops
and forests.
While this description of environmental problems in develop-
ing countries is incomplete, it helps explain why debt-for-nature
exchanges might be attractive to developing and industrialized
countries alike. We now turn to the economic concerns that lie
behind these exchanges.
39. IPCC REPORT, supra note 32, at 10. For further discussion of the interaction of nu-
merous national and global events explaining the trends in industrialized country emis-
sions, see Flavin, supra note 27, at 20. For a description of the factors accounting for the
increasing rate of carbon dioxide emissions in developing countries, see id. at 20-2 1; IPCC
REPORT, supra note 32, at 10-11. Particularly troubling is the suggestion that the rate of
growth of fossil fuel use in developing countries has been constrained in large part by
economic problems such as the debt crisis. If this is so, dramatic increases in fossil fuel use
might be expected to ensue upon solution of these problems. Flavin, supra note 27, at 20.
40. Flavin, supra note 37, at 30.
41. See Flavin, supra note 27, at 20; GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 191 (noting
that the 70% of humanity living in developing countries accounts for less than 20% of
world fossil fuel consumption).
42. Flavin, supra note 37, at 30.
43. The average woman in industrialized nations bears two children, whereas her coun-
terpart in the Middle East and Africa has between six and eight. The result is that more
than 90% of the world's population growth is occurring in the developing world. LEAN ET
AL., supra note 17, at 17.
44. Recent development efforts in such rapidly expanding economies as South Korea
have relied heavily upon an increased use of fossil fuels, lending credence to concerns that
economic development will be pursued along environmentally threatening lines. See Fla-
vin, supra note 27, at 20.
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B. Economic Concerns
Less developed nations face the general challenge of economic
growth. One of the most difficult aspects of the quest for growth
is the continuing accumulation of foreign debt. The cumulative
foreign debt of developing countries was estimated to be $1.34
trillion in 1990, and it is increasing.45 While the amount owed by
the severely indebted low-income countries is not, in absolute
terms, as great as that owed by the severely indebted middle-in-
come countries, the burden on the economies of the low-income
countries is especially serious. 46 As one indicator of this stress,
the ratio of debt to gross national product was recently 111 % for
the low-income countries. 47 Debt service exacts a heavy toll on
the economies of debtor nations. 48 In 1988, interest payments
alone on long-term foreign debt amounted to $60 billion.49 Since
1982, Latin American countries have sent a net total of $220 bil-
lion in capital to creditor nations. Most of that money consists of
payments of principal and interest on foreign debt.50 Despite the
payment by developing countries of billions of dollars in principal
and interest by the year 1988,51 the debt has continued to mount,
totalling $1.3 trillion in 1991.52
Because of the debt problem, the traditional net flow of capital
from industrialized to developing nations was reversed in 1982,
and transfers in the other direction are steadily increasing.53 In
45. See Melvyn Westlake, Recession Puts the Brakes on Recovery, THE GUARDIAN (int'l ed.),
Feb. 4, 1991, at 12 (discussing the continuing increase in the cumulative debt burden and
the recent reversal of progress made since 1988) [hereinafter Westlake I].
46. The foreign debt of the 26 severely indebted low-income countries, the majority of
which are in sub-Saharan Africa, is $116 billion. The foreign debt owed by the 20 severely
indebted middle-income countries, the bulk of which comprise Latin America, is $590 bil-
lion. The remainder of the $1.34 trillion figure is accounted for by countries with less
acute debt problems. Id.; Melvyn Westlake, The Continent that Suffers in Silence, THE GUARD-
IAN (int'l ed.), Feb. 5, 1991, at 13 [hereinafter Westlake II].
47. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at 126.
48. See id. at 222-23, Table 23 (conventional indicators of the ability of developing coun-
tries to support the burdens of servicing their debt, expressed both as a ratio of debt
service to exports and as a ratio of debt service to GNP).
49. Calculation of this figure based on id.
50. See Westlake I, supra note 45, at 12.
51. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at 222-23, Table 23.
52. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1991, at 24 (1991).
53. For a discussion of the history of the debt crisis, see Christine A. Bogdanowicz-
Bindert & Richard E. Feinberg, Third World Debt: An Analysis (Feb. 1988) (unpublished
paper, available from the World Wildlife Fund, Washington, D.C.). See also Michael
Chamberlin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 415, 415 & nn.1-4.
1992]
104 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:93
the early 1980s, poor countries received a $40 billion per year
surplus from rich countries; by 1988, they were sending back
many billions more to service their debts. 54 It is fully plausible
that debt is the most urgent problem confronting developing na-
tions in the world today. Above all, the problem is that debts must
be paid before these nations can shift their efforts to economic
and social development.
A particular difficulty is that the existence of foreign debt in-
creases the pressure on developing countries to exploit their nat-
ural resources, and to do so quickly. The use of natural resources
may provide the simplest way to obtain the funds necessary to pay
off debts. Such resources as waters, parks, soils, and forests are
the principal economic assets in these nations. Indeed, at the urg-
ing of the finance ministries of creditor nations and international
agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), many debtor nations have fashioned economic ad-
justment programs that revolve around efforts to increase ex-
ports. 55 Since primary commodities (non-manufactured goods)
comprise a substantial share of exports from most severely in-
debted countries, strategies of this kind tax the natural resources
of these countries and threaten the long-term viability of their re-
source-based economies. 56 The irony is that long-term develop-
ment requires measures that preserve an adequate stock of
natural resources for local use and export in forestry, agriculture,
fishing, and tourism, among others; these are precisely the meas-
ures endangered by current export strategies.
In Latin America in particular, the need to obtain funds to meet
debt obligations has put an immense amount of pressure on eco-
logical systems. The resulting policy has been to do little to com-
bat domestic problems while encouraging the export of natural
resources to developed countries at a rate that prevents the sus-
tainable use of those resources. 57 The environmental resources
54. LEAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 44.
55. See Westlake I, supra note 45, at 12.
56. In 1987 to 1988, primary, nonfuel commodities comprised 39.3% of exports from
severely indebted middle-income countries and 52.5% of exports from severely indebted
low-income countries. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at 20, Table 1.4.
Current price trends, moreover, threaten to exacerbate this dynamic. If the 33% decline
in commodity prices from 1980 to 1989 continues, developing countries may seek to ex-
port increasing quantities of commodities to obtain the same amount of revenue. Id. at 13.
57. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 6, 73-
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of developing countries have thus been under severe strain. Ethi-
opia's forest cover, for example, has diminished from 30% to 1%
of its territory and India's from over 50% to less than 14%.58 In
Africa, twenty-nine trees are cut down for every one that is
planted. 59 The result of the exploitation of existing resources,
made necessary in part by debt burdens, is reduction in the stock
of environmental capital, which increases rates of poverty, hun-
ger, and death. 60
There are plausible arguments that, for various reasons, the
debt owed by developing countries should be forgiven or in some
sense relieved or repudiated. We have seen that the existence of
debt imposes environmental burdens on developing countries,
burdens that produce risks for developed countries as well. For
this reason it is possible that debt forgiveness is in the interest of
all nations. There are a number of other justifications for relief.
In Latin America, for example, borrowing has been undertaken
by military governments without a solid connection to the citi-
zenry, with the purpose of providing for massive arms spending
or permitting capital flight. 6 ' Debt might be forgiven when it is
unclear if the leaders who incurred debts had legitimate authority
to act on behalf of their countries; perhaps citizens in these coun-
tries should not be obligated to pay debts that were not a product
of any plausible conception of consent or mutual benefit.
The dramatic increases in the expense and difficulty of debt
servicing may be attributable to circumstances that were not and
could not have been anticipated by debtor nations. For example,
real interest rates increased from zero or negative in the 1970s to
more than eight percent under the United States price index in
the early 1980s. 62 This increase in the burden of debt interest
service, which had no historical antecedents, was accompanied by
an increase in the value of the dollar, in which most debt is de-
58. See Jim MacNeill, Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development, in MANAGING PLANET
EARTH 108, 112-13 (1990).
59. Id. at 113.
60. See generally DAVID PEARCE ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMICS AND ENVI-
RONMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
61. See John Williamson, The Outlook for Debt Relief or Repudiation in Latin America, 2 Ox-
FORD REV. ECON. POL. 1, 4 (1986).
62. Real interest rates climbed as high as 9% in mid-1981, while they had been as low as
-3% in 1975. Even the average of the years 1980 to 1989, at 5.85%, was nearly six times
the average of the years 1974 to 1979 - when the developing countries took on a large
portion of their debt - at 0.97%. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note 24, at
14-15 & Fig. 1.6.
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nominated. The various increases were a function of shifts in the
policies of industrialized nations, and they were aggravated by
IMF policies raising the costs faced by debtors. 63 On this view,
industrialized nations are now under an obligation to undertake
debt relief.
There are other arguments for relief as well. As we have seen,
foreign debt imposes a crippling burden on developing countries.
This burden has been an obstacle to both internal development
and environmental protection. The result is considerable inter-
national distrust and ill will as well as domestic instability. The
existence of large debts has thus imposed severe pressure on the
global economic system. It has also required poor countries to
spend so much money on the servicing of loans that they are un-
able to pay for imported goods.6 As many as six million jobs
may have been lost in the developed world because of the debt
crisis.65 These arguments suggest that debt cancellation might
increase international harmony, help the export capacities of de-
veloping nations, eliminate a crucial reason for environmental
degradation, and operate as a mutually beneficial form of foreign
aid.6 6
We do not seek to evaluate these claims here. Among the obvi-
ous difficulties in any large-scale debt relief program are: the
problem of determining whether, ex ante or ex post, any govern-
ment has a legitimate claim to act on behalf of its citizenry; the
potential unfairness to creditors of permitting resources loaned
to developing nations to disappear; and the possibility that debt
relief or repudiation will in the end harm developing countries by
discouraging creditors from offering loans to them in the first in-
63. Id. at 15; LEAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 44.
64. See George C. Abbott, The Case for Cancellation, 1975 INTERECONOMICS 217, 220. For
the view that coordinated debt forgiveness can sometimes benefit all sides, see Kenneth A.
Froot, Buybacks, Exit Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief, 30 INT'L ECON. REV.
49 (1989).
65. See LEAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 44.
66. For a discussion emphasizing the benefits to creditor nations of taking on some of
the debtors' burdens, see Bogdanowicz-Bindert & Feinberg, supra note 53, at 2-3. It has
been suggested that this view accounts at least in part for the "official sanctioning" of the
principle and necessity of debt relief, as evidenced by the agreement reached by the group
of seven industrial powers at the 1988 Toronto Economic Summit. There the creditor
governments undertook to cancel, reduce, or restructure one-third of the debt owed to
them by the poorest countries. See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, supra note
24, at 126; Westlake II, supra note 46, at 13. The governments of Canada, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States have forgiven $5 billion in public loans to sub-
Saharan African countries. See Postel & Flavin, supra note 24, at 170, 176.
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stance. Because there is no conventional legal mechanism for en-
suring that debt is paid back, a firm international practice of
payment is perhaps the only guarantee that can be given to other-
wise reluctant creditors. Whether loan forgiveness is justified in
the particular context of developing nations in the 1990s is a
question that cannot be resolved here. We will assume that any
large-scale program of forgiveness is unlikely, while noting that
the case for loan forgiveness might have implications for debt-for-
nature and technology-for-nature trades.
The picture that emerges, then, is one in which developing
countries are under severe economic pressure, in significant part
because of foreign debt, and in which environmental degradation
is a predictable if myopic strategy for the accumulation of neces-
sary funds. Part III explores strategies that deal simultaneously
with the existence of foreign debt and environmental harms.
III. TRADING DEBT FOR NATURE
A. The Agreement
1. History
The idea that debt might be exchanged for nature was origi-
nally proposed in 1984 by Dr. Thomas E. Lovejoy, then Vice-
President for Science at the World Wildlife Fund ("WWF").
Lovejoy noted that programs calling for the management of natu-
ral resources were often eliminated by countries that needed to
reduce spending. Such countries thereafter relied on foreign do-
nors to obtain the funds necessary to support national parks. Ac-
cording to Lovejoy, it would be a simple and direct solution for
developed countries to take advantage of the debt crisis to deal
with environmental problems that threatened developing and in-
dustrialized nations alike. The solution was to create transactions
by which public or private actors in developed countries would
agree to retire some of the debt of a developing nation in return
for an agreement to protect natural resources. 67
The idea was implemented for the first time in 1987. Lender
banks, especially frustrated that debts had appeared to become
67. See Thomas E. Lovejoy III, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at
A31; Kathryn S. Fuller & Douglas F. Williamson, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Means of
Funding Conservation in Developing Nations, II Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 301 (May 1i, 1988).
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uncollectible, sought new means for alleviating this liability.68 A
number of conservation organizations offered to acquire foreign
debt from the banks and then retire the debt in return for conser-
vation. The first swap occurred in July 1987, as Conservation In-
ternational ("CI"), a private organization, purchased $650,000 of
Bolivia's commercial debt through Citicorp Investment Bank for
$100,000. In exchange the President of Bolivia agreed to set
aside over four million acres of tropical forest for national protec-
tion and to create a $250,000 fund for managing the area.69
Many debt-for-nature trades have followed. In December
1987, Ecuador and the United States branch of WWF ("WWF-
US") completed an exchange involving the purchase of $1 million
of Ecuadoran debt at thirty-five cents on the dollar; this exchange
was the first of a $10 million debt-for-nature program approved
by the government of Ecuador. The second exchange under the
Ecuadoran program, involving the remaining $9 million, took
place in April 1989. The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") and the
Missouri Botanical Gardens joined WWF-US as purchasers of the
debt at twelve cents on the dollar.70
Costa Rica participated in its first of five exchanges in February
1988. A recent swap, in March 1990, brought the total face value
of Costa Rican debt exchanged to $79,253,631. The purchasers
of the debt involved in the various Costa Rican exchanges in-
cluded WWF-US, TNC, Holland, Sweden, and the National Parks
Foundation of Costa Rica, with WWF assistance. 71
WWF-US has completed two swaps in the Philippines, the most
recent of which occurred in August 1990, exchanging an aggre-
gate of $1,290,000, at rates of 51 and 48.75 cents on the dollar
68. For a discussion of the range of items on banks' "menus" of available financing
options, see generally Chamberlin et al., supra note 53.
69. See Blueprint for Conservation and Development: Swapping Debt for Nature, TROPIcus, Fall
1987 (available from Conservation International, Washington, D.C.). See also WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, THE BOLIVIAN CASE (undated and unpublished document, available from
WWF, Washington, D.C.).
70. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE ECUADORAN CASE (undated and unpublished docu-
ment, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.); WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, OFFICIALLY SANC-
TIONED AND FUNDED DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS TO DATE: DECEMBER 1990 (unpublished
table, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter WWF SWAPS TO DATE].
71. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE COSTA RICAN CASE (undated and unpublished doc-
ument, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.); WWF SWAPS TO DATE, supra note 70.
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respectively. 72 WWF-US' two exchanges in Madagascar involved
a total of $3,030,475; in Zambia, WWF-International purchased
debt with a face value of $2,270,000; and in Poland, WWF-US
purchased $50,000 of debt. 73 TNC and the Puerto Rican Conser-
vation Trust, in March 1990, bought debt of the Dominican Re-
public having a face value of $582,000. 74
2. Mechanics
The mechanics of debt-for-nature swaps follow a basic pat-
tern.75 An interested group, usually an international nongovern-
mental organization ("NGO"), purchases, on the secondary
market, developing country debt held by an international lender.
The price is discounted from the face value of the debt. 76 The
purchasing group then trades its right to repayment of the debt
for a commitment on the part of the developing nation to protect,
in some fashion, the environmentally vulnerable lands within its
territory. This trade may involve exchanging the debt instrument
directly for legislative protection by the debtor country govern-
ment. Alternatively, it may involve transferring the debt to a
debtor country conservation organization, which will then turn it
over to its government in exchange for local currency or local
currency bonds to be used to finance a conservation program
managed by the local group.
The parties to debt-for-nature agreements have fashioned a
number of variations on this basic model. These variations often
increase the complexity of the deal, but they also increase the
likelihood of serving the interests of everyone involved. In the
Bolivia swap, CI traded the debt that it had purchased on the sec-
ondary market with the government of Bolivia in direct exchange
72. WWF SWAPS TO DATE, supra note 70; WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PHILIPPINES DEBT-FOR-
NATURE SWAP TERM SHEET (undated and unpublished document, available from WWF,
Washington, D.C.).
73. WWF SWAPS TO DATE, supra note 70.
74. Id.
75. For an elaboration on the mechanics of debt-for-nature swaps and a description of
the process of negotiating such transactions, see Konrad von Moltke, Debt for Nature: An
Overview 1-2 (undated and unpublished paper, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.).
76. To date, debt-for-nature trades have involved the purchase of commercial bank
debt, for which a secondary market exists; discussions are underway, however, to enlist the
resources of some types of bilateral government debt for these swaps. See DEBT-FOR-NA-
TURE: SOME COMMON QUESTIONS 2-3 (Sept. 1990) (unpublished paper, available from
WWF, Washington, D.C.).
1992]
110 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:93
for legislative measures. 77 In successive swaps, the nature por-
tion of the transactions has most often been structured to include
support for local conservation groups - a crucial step. In the
first exchange of the Ecuadoran program, WWF-US acquired
debt with a face value of $1 million at thirty-five cents on the dol-
lar and assigned this debt to Fundaci6n Natura. Fundaci6n
Natura exchanged this debt for government bonds issued in su-
cres at 100% of the debt's face value. Both the interest and the
principal of the nine-year bonds are to be used to finance Funda-
ci6n Natura conservation activities. 78
The mechanics of the Philippines swap were similar to those in
the Ecuadoran swap, except that the exchange was for cash rather
than local currency bonds. The Philippines' Central Bank
credited the full value of the debt to a local currency account for
the benefit of the Haribon Foundation, a conservation group in
the Philippines, and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources .79
3. Environmental Commitments
The environmental commitments undertaken in the various
swaps accommodate a broad array of ecological and policy goals
of the various developing countries. These commitments range
from the preservation of specific areas, to the creation of pro-
grams for education and training, to the establishment of funds
for environmental uses whose details are left to later determina-
tion. In the Bolivian arrangement, for example, the government
elevated to the highest legal protective status the existing
334,200-acre Beni Biosphere Reserve. It also created, with the
same level of legal protection, an adjoining 877,205-acre reserve,
as well as an additional 2,870,561-acre buffer zone - the
Chimane Forest Reserve - to be developed in a sustainable man-
77. See THE BOLIVIAN CASE, supra note 69.
78. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, ECUADOR DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP TERM SHEET (undated
and unpublished document, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.); THE ECUADORAN
CASE, supra note 70. The first exchange of the Costa Rican program was similarly struc-
tured, although the bonds issued in colones represented only 75% of the face value of the
indebtedness for which they were exchanged. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, COSTA RICA DEBT-
FOR-NATURE SWAP TERM SHEET (undated and unpublished document, available from
WWF, Washington, D.C.); THE COSTA RICAN CASE, supra note 71. For criticism of this
aspect of the Costa Rican arrangement, see Chamberlin et al., supra note 53, at 445 n. 115.
79. See PHILIPPINES DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP TERM SHEET, supra note 72; WORLD WILD-
LIFE FUND, THE PHILIPPINES CASE (undated and unpublished document, available from
WWF, Washington, D.C.).
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ner. Finally, Bolivia designated the local currency equivalent of
$250,000 for the establishment of an operational fund for the
management of the Biosphere Reserve. 80
Under the Ecuadoran agreement, the interest paid on the
bonds during the first year is to be used for the protection and
management of several specified parks and reserves. 81 The
agreement provides that the interest paid on the bonds in succes-
sive years is to be used for projects later selected by Fundaci6n
Natura, in conjunction with WWF-US. Upon maturity of the
bonds, the principal is designated for the establishment of an en-
dowment fund to support the general activities of Fundaci6n
Natura. 82
The Philippines swap, in addition to funding the protection and
management of two specified reserves, emphasizes the need for
education and training. The agreement envisages a range of pro-
grams, from field training to university fellowships. The terms of
the agreement prohibit the use of any of the proceeds for the
compensation of non-Philippine consultants. 83
The Madagascar commitments include funding the training and
equipment of 400 park rangers for certain protected areas. 84 Fi-
nally, the Zambia agreement, among other things, provides spe-
cifically for the alleviation of habitat degradation and the
protection of that country's threatened rhinoceros and elephant
populations .85
80. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 53, at 441-42; THE BOLIVIAN CASE, supra note 69;
Debt Trade Follow Up in the Beni Reserve, TROPICUS, Winter 1988 (available from Conserva-
tion International, Washington, D.C.).
81. "Protection and management" includes the elaboration of management plans, the
building of a management infrastructure, the institution of preservation and environmen-
tal education programs, and the sustainable use of natural resources. The designated ar-
eas are the Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve, the Cotacachi-Cayapas Ecological Reserve,
the Sangay National Park, the Podocarpus National Park, the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve,
the Yasuni National Park, the Galapagos National Park, and the Pasochoa Nature Reserve.
Attachment to Debt-for-Nature Agreement of December 14, 1987, between WWF-U.S.
and Fundaci6n Natura (unpublished document, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.).
82. See ECUADOR DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP TERM SHEET, supra note 78; THE ECUADORAN
CASE, supra note 70.
83. See THE PHILIPPINES CASE, supra note 79.
84. See Kathryn S. Fuller, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 23 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 1450, 1451
(1989).
85. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, ZAMBIA DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP TEEM SHEET (undated
and unpublished document, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.).
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B. Objections
There have been a number of objections to debt-for-nature
trades. The objections generally fall into four categories: (a) no-
tions of political and economic sovereignty, (b) allegations of
colonialism, (c) administrative and enforcement difficulties, and
(d) limited results. We address each of these objections in turn.
1. Sovereignty
Some observers argue that debt-for-nature exchanges pose a
threat to national sovereignty. This objection has taken various
forms. Former President Sarney of Brazil has claimed that these
exchanges are part of a campaign to halt development in poor
nations.8 6 Labor leaders in Bolivia have criticized what they see
as, in effect, a sale of national assets to large international inter-
ests.8 7 They contend that "if land today can be sold for environ-
mental protection, tomorrow it can be sold under another cover
but with the same end: accepting the dictates of the centers of
political and economic power." 8 On this view, the debt-for-na-
ture swap represents an effort by the economic powers of the de-
veloped north to exert political authority over the developing
south.
At least in general, we believe that this objection has little
merit. If developing countries have voluntarily entered into
agreements to trade debt for nature, the fact that such agree-
ments entail an intrusion on what would otherwise be rights of
sovereignty is no objection. By hypothesis, both parties to a vol-
untary agreement are made better off. Indeed, the existence of
foreign debt may well be a far greater threat to sovereignty than is
an agreement to protect natural assets. Debt itself entails owner-
ship of national assets by others. If this is so, sovereignty is en-
hanced rather than diminished by debt-for-nature trades. In any
case, that issue appears at first glance to be one for the develop-
ing nation to decide; if the decision is voluntary, the objection
from sovereignty seems weak.
More refined versions of the objection, however, are somewhat
more plausible. Under the immediate pressure of the debt crisis,
86. Hobart Rowen, Heading Off an Amazon Disaster, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1989, at HI.
87. Erick Foronda, Bolivia's 'Debt-for-Nature' Swap Comes Under Fire, LATINAMERICA PRESS,
Oct. 20, 1989, at 7.
88. Id. (quoting labor leader Andrbs Soliz Rada).
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developing nations may be tempted to enter into contracts that
are not in their best long-term interest because they create a per-
manent loss of control over natural resources. Here the problem
is that the relevant deal reflects a form of myopia - a rationale
often brought forth to bar seemingly voluntary agreements.8 9
Alternatively, it may be suggested that certain attributes of sov-
ereignty should not be commodified, that is, that states ought not
to be authorized to trade aspects of self-government in return for
money. It might well be troubling, for example, if a country fac-
ing an enormous debt decided to trade, in exchange for dollars,
the power to make a set of future decisions about its social and
economic development, its religious and ethical commitments, its
basic culture, or its forms of governance. This example presents
two problems. The first involves one set of people binding future
citizens who are not actual parties to the deal. The second in-
volves the decision to allow a portion of self-governance - here
the power to manage natural resources - to be traded on mar-
kets at all.
In the context of the ordinary debt-for-nature trade, we believe
that these problems do not amount to powerful objections. With
respect to the questions of myopia and implications for future
generations, the central point is that the decision to protect natu-
ral resources is, to a significant degree, in the long-term interests
of the developing nation, and is subjectively perceived as such.
As we have seen, the exploitation of resources is often a product
of the external pressure of the debt crisis rather than some inter-
nal free choice. The trade helps to relieve that pressure. More-
over, and crucially, future generations are made better rather
than worse off through arrangements that relieve their own finan-
cial pressures, which would otherwise produce environmental
degradation posing a severe threat to future citizens.
We also believe that the debt-for-nature trade poses no real
threat of commodifying a nation's power of self-governance.90
Any intrusion of that sort is minor in scale and scope. The pres-
ence of debt itself creates precisely the same threat, and to the
extent that the trade reduces foreign debt, it actually frees up the
nation's capacity for self-governance. Moreover, the trade en-
89. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
1129, 1164-66 (1986) (discussing myopia).
90. Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987) (dis-
cussing the risks of commodifying in general).
19921
114 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (Vol. 17:93
ables the nation to overcome a form of myopia, again produced
by external pressures, rather than submitting to it. Frequently,
economic development that is insufficiently respectful of environ-
mental needs is a straightforward sacrifice of the future, and of
future generations, for the immediate present. Insofar as debt-
for-nature trades counteract this tendency, they are in the interest
of everyone involved.
As we discuss below, the relevant concerns about sovereignty
can be met through creative structuring of the trade. 9 ' Such
structuring attempts to ensure local participation and autonomy,
thus strengthening local institutions and local options.
2.. Colonialism
It is sometimes suggested that the debt-for-nature trade in-
volves a form of colonialism, that is, the imposition by wealthy
countries of values held by them, an imposition made possible
only by disparities in wealth. This argument seems largely to re-
capitulate arguments from sovereignty, and to do so in especially
dramatic form.
We do not believe that this objection is persuasive. So long as
the debts have been lawfully incurred, the foreign country has
voluntarily entered into the deal, the agreement is structured to
promote the ability of the developing nation to choose its own
means of providing protection, and the goal is to prevent envi-
ronmental degradation, the objection of colonialism seems
misplaced.
To say this is not to deny that the objection points to significant
risks. In light of those risks, it is important to ensure that the
arrangement is organized so as to promote flexibility and to maxi-
mize the capacity of the developing country to protect its own
resources in its own way. Agreements by which developed coun-
tries impose a highly particular environmental philosophy, select
means of carrying out environmental ends, or conscript manage-
rial authority that might otherwise be respectful of native norms
and traditions, might well provide a basis for legitimate com-
plaint. We return to these issues below. 9 2
91. See infra part III(C).
92. See infra part III(C).
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3. Administrative and Enforcement Difficulties
Sometimes it is said that the debt-for-nature trade poses insu-
perable problems of administration and enforcement. Suppose,
for example, that a question is raised about whether the develop-
ing country has complied with some provisions of the deal. How
are such questions to be resolved? No international tribunal is in
a position to ensure compliance with the agreement or to provide
remedies in the event of a default.
Without an enforcement mechanism, the parties must depend
on the monitoring capacity of one side or on the good faith of the
other. Perhaps these will be sufficient, independently or in con-
junction, in most cases. Without more particular information,
however, it is difficult to know whether optimism is justified. For
this reason, concerns about administrability are warranted.93
4. Limited Results
It is also suggested that debt-for-nature trades will, at best, pro-
duce limited results. Although recent exchanges and programs
have involved increasingly ambitious amounts of debt, numerous
financial and regulatory constraints remain. First, commercial
banks have only limited incentives to sell or donate the debt for
use in such exchanges. Such banks would, of course, prefer to
receive full repayment of the debts. In light of ongoing debt ne-
gotiations, they will usually be reluctant to compromise their bar-
gaining position by offering a discounted rate in a debt-for-nature
exchange.
Despite these limitations, banks will realize some benefits from
the donation or sale of the debt at a greatly reduced price. In the
case of a sale, banks can remove from their books a nonperform-
ing loan and receive a bad debt tax deduction for the remainder;
in the case of a donation, they will gain goodwill from favorable
93. According to the March 1990 report of the compliance review of the 1988 Costa
Rican swap, the parties charged with managing the trust and its yield have performed well
and Parque Nacional Guanacaste ("PNG") has been undertaking in good faith to purchase
a parcel of land identified for protection under the swap arrangement. See WORLD WILD-
LIFE FUND, COMPLIANCE REVIEW OF 1988 COSTA RICAN DEBT-FOR-NATURE AGREEMENT 5
(March 1990) (unpublished report, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
COSTA RICAN COMPLIANCE REPORT]. The problem remains, however, that it is simply too
early to assess the level of compliance, and conclusions drawn in audits of the sort under-
taken by WWF in Costa Rica are preliminary at best.
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publicity and receive generous tax treatment.9 4 In general, how-
ever, these benefits simply do not warrant - especially in the eyes
of the shareholders - large-scale use by the banks of this strategy
for reducing their outstanding debt.9 5 The limited incentives for
participation by banks significantly reduce the effectiveness of the
debt-for-nature scheme in eliminating third world debt.
Other potential sources of financing can, at present, provide
only relatively small amounts. International NGOs cannot devote
financial resources on the scale required, and international aid
agencies have been, for the most part, unable or unwilling to offer
significant funding.96 Moreover, regulations imposed by debtor
nations, and restrictions imposed by previous debt restructuring
agreements, may limit the amount of debt eligible for debt-for-
nature exchanges. 97
94. For a detailed analysis of the relevant United States. tax incentives after recent
changes, see Terrill A. Hyde, U.S. Taxes: The Issues (undated and unpublished paper,
available from WWF, Washington, D.C.).
95. Nonetheless, insofar as banks have decided to trade their debt on the secondary
market, conservation groups are welcomed as would be any other purchaser. Many addi-
tional factors explain individual banks' interests in debt-for-nature exchanges, including
their portfolio composition and their desire to maintain long-term financial relations with
particular countries. For discussion of commercial banks' perspective on debt exchanges,
on which we have drawn here, see von Moltke, supra note 75, at 3-4; Chamberlin et al.,
supra note 53.
96. The participation of the United States' Agency for International Development
("AID") in the Madagascar swap provides a welcome exception to the general reluctance
of governmental aid agencies. AID granted $1 million to WWF to facilitate the 1989 Mad-
agascar exchange. See A Debt to Nature, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 1989, at 31.
Although the multilateral development banks ("MDBs") have yet to commit funds to a
debt-for-nature swap, there have been several indications of support, from, among others,
the United States Department of Treasury and the MDBs themselves, for involving MDBs
in the financing of these arrangements. Congress enacted, in December 1989, The Inter-
national Development and Finance Act of 1989, encouraging, among other things, MDB
involvement in debt-for-nature swaps. See International Debt Exchanges and the Environ-
ment, Title V, Subtitle B of the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-240, §§ 511-12, 103 Stat. 2492, 2507-10 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 262p-4i-4k,
2 6 2p-5 (Supp. I 1989)). The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
supports the debt-for-nature swap strategy, but claims that its charter prevents it from
financing or negotiating debt-for-nature swaps involving outstanding public debt,
although it might be able to perform the function of a clearinghouse for information. See
Chamberlin et al., supra note 53, at 440 n.99; WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 78-79 (1990).
For criticism of World Bank's rhetoric without action, see Joannides, supra note 11, at
175 & n.75.
97. Not all public sector debt of a developing country may be eligible for exchange.
Some restrictions are carried on the debt instruments themselves; others are informal,
imposed for policy reasons by the developing countries. See Chamberlin et al., supra note
53, at 435 & nn.81-82. See also von Moltke, supra note 75, at 1-2.
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Finally, large-scale debt exchanges have a serious potential in-
flationary impact on the economy of the developing country. 98
This consideration necessarily imposes limitations on the magni-
tude of debt-for-nature programs. Participants in recent swaps,
sensitive to this potential problem, have included mechanisms
that mitigate inflationary effects, such as converting debt into lo-
cal bonds rather than cash.99 Yet they concede that addressing
this criticism will at some point require the imposition of ceilings
on the amount of debt converted.100 It appears that the extent of
environmental protection to be generated by such trades will be
far less than is necessary to protect the long-term environmental
interests of either the developing nation or the world.
This point is crucial. Even if debt-for-nature exchanges were to
continue to grow in number and scope, they would have only lim-
ited impact. The debt of developing countries is so enormous
that trades of this sort will make only small inroads. 10 Even
more important, developing countries cannot continue to meet
the burdensome requirements of debt servicing and repayment
by engaging in unsustainable productive practices. We have seen
that the self-destructive nature of these practices threatens severe
environmental harm. 102
A more basic problem is that the solution offered by debt-for-
nature swaps is superficial. It does not provide a mechanism for
changing the incentives for engaging in destructive behavior.
Debt-for-nature trades do little to change the underlying pres-
sures of debt and environmental destruction, and do not offer an
alternative way for developing countries to manage these pres-
sures. In failing to present a long-term solution, debt-for-nature
trades can provide only a partial corrective.
98. See Chamberlin et al., supra note 53, at 446.
99. See Fuller, supra note 84, at 1451.
100. See Fuller & Williamson, supra note 67, at 302, 303; David Reed, Debt for Nature
Controversies (Dec. 1989) (unpublished paper, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.).
101. It should be noted, however, that some proponents of debt-for-nature swaps main-
tain that these arrangements were never intended to have an appreciable impact on the
debt crisis. See Reed, supra note 100. Instead, they argue, the purchase and exchange of
discounted debt merely serves as a funding mechanism, permitting developed countries or
international environmental groups to leverage their conservation dollars. See Fuller &
Williamson, supra note 67, at 302.
102. See supra part II(A).
19921
118 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:93
This point is not an objection to such trades. It is an invitation
to develop alternative strategies for promoting sustainable devel-
opment. We turn to such mechanisms in Part IV.
C. Variations in Answer to Criticisms
It is possible to structure debt-for-nature trades so as to mini-
mize the grounds for objection. In each case, of course, the trans-
action must be designed to address the unique concerns of the
individual debtor country. We believe, however, that there are
many general lessons to be taken from the experiences of existing
swaps.
Perhaps the most important is the need to take into account
legitimate sovereignty concerns. Ideally, the debtor nation would
initiate a debt-for-nature program and approach international
NGOs to participate in exchanges under the program. 0 3
Whether or not there is such an impetus, however, it is critical
that the debtor country government and local conservation
groups be involved from the outset - contributing to the identifi-
cation of priorities; to the conception of projects; and, through-
out the projects, to the management of activities.' 0 4
One strategy, favored by many participants in existing debt-for-
nature programs, involves directing funds to established conser-
vation programs in the debtor country. This tactic responds di-
rectly to criticisms that debt-for-nature trades provide a tool for
the imposition of northern values or of a particular environmental
ethic. It also undermines claims that local conservation groups
are being co-opted to carry out the goals set by large interna-
tional organizations. Moreover, because the debtor country gov-
ernment and, perhaps, local conservation groups have fashioned
the conservation program without external influence from inter-
103. The fact that the concept underlying the Ecuador program originated with the
then president of Fundaci6n Natura, Ecuador's leading private conservation organization,
is cited as contributing to the recognition of the Ecuador arrangement as one of the most
successful debt-for-nature swaps. See Fuller, supra note 84, at 1451.
104. Id. See also Reed, supra note 100. For a summary of the criticisms of the initial
attempts at debt-for-nature transactions, see Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Oppor-
tunity for Nonprofits, Commercial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 233, 241-43
(1990). We believe that, in concluding that all debt-for-nature swaps are inherently flawed
on this count, Burton overstates the case for sovereignty. But we agree there are impor-
tant lessons to be learned about the need to address sovereignty concerns. Cf. MARTHA
ALTER CHEN, A QuIET REVOLUTION: WOMEN IN TRANSITION IN RURAL BANGLADESH 5-17
(1989) (discussing overcoming of women's illiteracy in Bangladesh through strategies that
incorporate views and perspectives of Bangladeshi women).
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national NGOs and others, there is an increased likelihood that
the funds will be used to further the true goals and interests of
the developing country, and will be perceived as doing so. Fi-
nally, this strategy helps strengthen environmental education and
environmental constituencies in the developing country, in a way
that should accomplish long-term good. 10 5
Concerns about administrability and implementation can also
be alleviated in some measure by careful structuring of the debt-
for-nature arrangement. Again, involvement by the debtor coun-
try conservation group is essential. Local groups are in the best
position to ensure that programs are implemented. They have
established liaisons with the community and local public officials,
and these liaisons are often vital to carrying out the intended pro-
grams.' 0 6 Debtor country conservation groups also have the
greatest interest in long-term local environmental viability and
thus in the success of the projects undertaken as a result of the
swap. Finally, they are in the best position to see that local knowl-
edge and experience are brought to bear on the implementation
of the program, thereby enhancing its cultural compatibility and
its efficacy.
Another means of addressing concerns about compliance in-
volves selection of the right mechanism for disbursing funds in
the developing country. Any such mechanism should enhance
the financial stability - and thus the likelihood of continued suc-
cess - of environmental protection efforts. One desirable
method, employed in the Ecuador arrangement, is the use of
bonds. These provide an initial steady flow of funds and create,
upon maturity, an endowment fund upon which the local conser-
vation group can rely for its future activities. 10 7
In addition, agreements should contain data collection and dis-
closure agreements. Annual reports might well outline progress
105. On the importance of internal initiative, see JEAN DR9ZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER
AND PUBLIC ACTION 159 (1990).
106. The constant involvement and local residency of the Parque Nacional Guanacaste
("PNG") in Costa Rica has been indispensable to ongoing negotiations for the purchase of
the Santa Elena property, as contemplated by the swap agreement. See COSTA RICAN COM-
PLIANCE REPORT, supra note 93, at 5.
107. See Fuller & Williamson, supra note 67, at 302 ("Because the [Ecuadoran] bonds
have a nine-year term, the planning and implementation of long-range programs can pro-
ceed without fear that project funding may be cut off next year."). For the view that large
lump sum disbursements can be problematic, see von Moltke, supra note 75, at 5.
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on the relevant commitments.10 8 Finally, it is important to permit
funds to be used for purposes of education and increasing envi-
ronmental awareness among the population of the debtor nation.
One of the primary goals for environmental policy is to increase
the amount and availability of information about environmental
issues, thereby promoting economic goals and, at the same time,
serving democratic aspirations. Such initiatives also increase the
likelihood that the environmental commitments made in debt-for-
nature deals will survive future periods of economic difficulty. By
promoting local understanding of environmental issues, educa-
tion makes it more likely that there will be sufficient political will
to ensure that the terms of the agreement are upheld, and that
conservation and other environmental goals will be promoted in
the future.
The overall success of debt-for-nature transactions can be in-
creased by attention to an array of related issues. First, the poten-
tial inflationary impact of debt exchanges should be mitigated by
the use of disbursement mechanisms that allow the debtor coun-
try to spread any repayments to the conservation group over a
longer period of time. 09 Second, training programs in conserva-
tion and environmental sciences and management should be in-
cluded in the conservation program of the developing countries.
Such programs could range from complex technological matters,
for local experts, to information applicable to daily life, including
energy-efficient cooking techniques. This mechanism should fa-
cilitate the creation of the human and technical infrastructure
necessary to strengthen the countries' long-term economic and
natural resource base. Habitat protection should also be a central
part of the agreement; this is a good way to provide long-term
environmental protection. 1 1O
Finally, in some developing countries there is, in effect, a dual
society of landed elites and poor. Debt-for-nature trades can be
structured to encourage the participation of new, smaller conser-
vation groups along with the established groups. These fledgling
groups can thereby gain expertise and, importantly, provide alter-
native voices to challenge the existing system of vested economic
108. See French, supra note 8, at 164.
109. The use in the Ecuadoran swap of nine-year bonds, and the allowance of three to
four years for payment of the cash owed under the Madagascar and Zambia swaps, help to
accomplish this goal. See Fuller, supra note 84, at 1451.
110. See Ryan, supra note 16, at 23-26.
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interests and priorities, many of which threaten the environ-
ment."'I Participation of non-elite conservation groups from de-
veloping countries can enhance the likelihood that debt-for-
nature programs reflect the needs of a wide cross section of the
peoples of developing countries.
We conclude that through such strategies, it is possible to
structure debt-for-nature trades in a way that responds to most of
the traditional objections. So structured, such trades hold out
considerable promise for decreasing debt and protecting re-
sources in ways that benefit developing and developed countries
alike.
Thus far, the record suggests that debt-for-nature swaps have
produced good results in the real world." l2 Not even careful
structuring of debt-for-nature transactions, however, can elimi-
nate all of the relevant problems. One such defect, noted above,
is that agreements that support debt-for-nature swaps are not
readily enforceable, which is a serious concern.' 13 Second, we
have suggested that potential parties, particularly those financing
the debt side of the equation, are usually unable or unwilling to
enter into these arrangements on a large scale." 4 Finally, mecha-
nisms that merely reduce debt obligations inadequately address
11l. For a discussion of WWF's efforts to accommodate the interests of non-elite devel-
oping country conservation groups, see Reed, supra note 100.
112. When measured in terms of the amount of developing country conservation funds
generated per dollar invested by international NGOs or other conservation purchasers,
debt exchanges prove to be a successful means of leveraging conservation financing. For
example, the first Ecuadoran exchange provided $1,000,000 in conservation funds, at a
cost to WWF of $354,000; in the Zambia swap, WWF's $454,000 generated $2,270,000 for
conservation; and in the 1990 Philippines exchange, WWF's $438,750 bought $900,000 in
conservation funds. See WWF SWAPS TO DATE, supra note 70.
Other less quantifiable indicia of the success of debt-for-nature swaps include the con-
tinued, ambitious employment of this device by an increasingly diverse array of parties,
including formerly skeptical developing country governments, governments of developed
countries and their bilateral aid agencies, and multilateral development banks.
Whether there have been significant gains in environmental protection is more difficult
to assess. In most cases, it is simply too early to discern whether debt-for-nature swaps
have contributed measurably to either local or global environmental viability. Initial au-
dits, however, have been positive. The WWF in March 1990 conducted a compliance re-
view of the 1988 Costa Rican exchange and found that the funds from the swap had been
"instrumental" in supporting important conservation program activities. See COSTA RICAN
COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 93, at 9 (concluding that the results of the swap to date
were positive).
113. See Timothy B. Hamlin, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Strategy for Protecting Environ-
mental Interests in Developing Nations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1065, 1085-87 (1989).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
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both the immediate issue of stemming deforestation and the more
general problems of environmental degradation, because they do
not change the incentives for engaging in that behavior. In Part
IV, we propose the possibility of taking steps that deal more effec-
tively with the problems of development and environmental deg-
radation in developing nations.
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENCY, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT
For developed and developing countries alike, there is a basic
obstacle to environmental protection, energy independence, and
economic growth: the absence of widespread implementation of
techniques for energy efficiency. In the developing countries in
particular, inefficient technologies are a severe local problem, one
with potentially disastrous consequences for both particular
countries and the world as a whole."l 5 Most fundamentally, more
efficient energy output will allow for greater development at
lower cost. For developing countries, the closely linked problems
of poverty and development find a valuable if partial solution
through energy efficiency.
Any strategy for using economic incentives to redress these
problems would have to begin with an understanding of the po-
tential economic and environmental advantages of energy effi-
ciency. The short-term goal of such a strategy would be to ensure
dissemination of efficient technologies. Ultimately, the effort
would be to promote the widespread use of energy sources other
than fossil fuels, which are the most important source of environ-
mental degradation. 1 6 We propose an arrangement - a tech-
nology-for-nature exchange - designed to facilitate these
economic and environmental goals. We discuss the contours of
such arrangements and suggest legal reforms to increase the effi-
115. As one example of the historical importance of technology to economic progress,
consider that technological change is estimated to have accounted for 90% of the produc-
tivity gains in the United States economy between 1909 and 1949. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 91. For a discussion of innovation in an integrated world economy and
the suggestion that integration both increases the incentives for and the benefits from
innovation, see PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 166-67 (1990).
116. Eventually it will be necessary for countries now dependent on fossil fuels to find
substitute energy sources, a conclusion shared by a wide variety of commentators. See, e.g.,
BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 191-210 (1989); Christopher Flavin &
Nicholas Lenssen, Designing a Sustainable Energy System, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1991, supra
note 24, at 21, 38; John H. Gibbons et al., Strategies for Energy Use, in MANAGING PLANET
EARTH 85 (1990); OPPENHEIMER & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 175-206.
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cacy of the proposed exchanges. A particular problem is the lack
of incentives to implement and distribute existing technologies to
developing countries; we attempt to respond to that problem
here.
A. Energy Efficiency
Energy, the capacity to do work, is indispensable to support
productive activity. According to accepted wisdom, increased en-
ergy consumption is a prerequisite to economic growth. 1 7 The
view that consumption and development are inextricably linked
underlies the use of energy consumption as a yardstick for eco-
nomic progress."l 8 Energy efficiency technologies weaken the
link between growth and increased consumption. It is for this
reason that both scientists and policy makers have pointed to en-
ergy efficiency as the area holding the greatest potential for re-
turns on private and public investments that will advance both
environmental and developmental goals." 19
1. Definitions
Energy efficiency is a relative term; it permits comparison of
the amount of energy input required to produce a unit of output,
that is, a given quantum of work, goods, services, or prosperity.
For purposes of assessing the overall efficiency with which a
country uses energy, comparisons are often based upon energy
intensities - measurements of the amount of energy required per
increment of gross national product ("GNP") or gross domestic
product ("GDP").120 In the 1980s, for example, France required
about half as much primary energy to generate a dollar of GDP as
117. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 219-20.
118. Id. at 2 ("So important is energy to human society that the magnitude of energy
consumed per'capita became one of the indicators of a country's 'modernization.' "). Con-
sider, too, the history of the Soviet Union's energy policy, which traditionally involved
subsidizing supply to republics and satellites and which encouraged consumption as a
measure of wealth and prosperity.
119. See id. at 2-4, 63-65 (advocating a shift away from a supply-oriented approach to
these problems to one that has its foundation in energy efficient end-use strategies). See
also WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Supra note 13, at 174.
120. See, e.g., Gibbons et al., supra note 116, at 85-97. Cf. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note
21, at 219-21 (cautioning against emphasis on GDP as indicator of economic growth in
context of energy planning in developing countries because of tendency to skew policy).
See also VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 6-8 (1989)
(criticizing use of measure of productivity, i.e. GNP, as measure of development and exam-
ining effect on ecosystem and women in developing countries).
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did the United States.' 21 Europe's energy intensity, in total pri-
mary energy requirements per GDP, at 0.33 in the mid-1980s,
shows it to be a far more efficient producer than Brazil, whose
energy intensity was 0.58, and than Poland, whose energy inten-
sity was 0.95.122
One formulation of the concept, particularly useful for making
comparisons among different technologies, measures how much
primary energy is required by a given process or end-use to do
work. Thus, for example, one can compare the light energy out-
put, in lumens per unit of energy consumed in the lighting device,
of kerosene lamps and electric (incandescent) light bulbs: the
electric bulbs produce about 200 times the luminous output of
kerosene lamps, that is, they are about 200 times as efficient.123
2. Experience in the Developed World
The last two decades have seen dramatic and largely unantici-
pated increases in energy efficiency in the industrialized world.
Energy demand projections, made in the 1970s by the United
States Department of Energy and by the International Energy
Agency, grossly overestimated primary energy supply require-
ments and have had to be revised as growth in energy demand
has slowed throughout the 1980s. 124 The failure in demand pro-
jections resulted in large part from the unexpected emergence of
a wide range of technologies using much less primary energy to
provide various energy services.1 25
In many industrialized countries, energy efficiency increased by
an average of 1.7% annually between 1973 and 1983.126 In the
period 1978 to 1982, the final energy use per United States
household decreased by 30%, representing a 7.6% per year aver-
age rate of decline. 27 According to one study, energy conserva-
tion strategies in various sectors increased energy efficiency by
2.5% annually between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, with esti-
121. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 73-74.
122. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY IN NON-OECD COUNTRIES: SELECTED
Topics 1988, at 47, Table 30 (1988).
123. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 258.
124. See id. at 78.
125. Id. at 85. A major factor contributing to this technological innovation was the six-
fold increase in world oil prices following the oil crises of the 1970s. Id. See also BRITISH
PETROLEUM COMPANY, supra note 38, at 12-13.
126. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 196.
127. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 169.
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mated savings of over $150 billion annually. 128 The result has
been carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide emis-
sions reductions of about 40%.129
Moreover, there is great potential for continued energy effi-
ciency gains. Much of the technology for such improvements al-
ready exists; some of it is commercially available. Compact
fluorescent light bulbs, for example, which use 18 rather than 75
watts to produce the same amount of light and last over seven
times as long as conventional bulbs, are currently available.' 30
Compact fluorescent lamps and similar products could save over
$25 billion annually, and reduce hundreds of millions of tons of
carbon dioxide emissions while providing other environmental
gains. 131
Although the average refrigerator now in use in the United
States uses 3.4 kilowatt-hours of energy per liter per year, com-
mercially available alternatives employing the best available tech-
nology use 1.3 to 1.7 kilowatt-hours per liter per year. Advanced
prototypes would use 0.7 kilowatt-hours per liter per year.' 3 2 Im-
proved windows in American buildings save about the equivalent
of an Alaska pipeline - 1.8 million oil barrels each day - and
new windows could provide large additional savings.' 33 Two
American utilities project 19% reductions over the next twenty
years in carbon emissions from improved energy efficiency in
buildings. 134
Steel production is another area where energy efficiency can
produce significant results. In 1979, producers in the United
States required 27 gigajoules ("GJ") of final energy per ton of raw
steel. Sweden's average in 1976 was 22 GJ. The best available
technology, now being adapted for commercial use in Sweden,
would reduce the amount of energy required to 15 GJ. Technol-
ogy now under development would bring this figure down to be-
tween 9 and 12 GJ.13 5
128. See Claudine Schneider, Energy Conservation, EPA JOURNAL, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 11,
12.
129. Id.
130. Lester R. Brown et al., supra note 20, at 180.
131. Id.
132. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 87, Table 2.1.
133. See Schneider, supra note 128, at 11-12.
134. Flavin, supra note 27, at 33.
135. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 87, Table 2.1.
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3. Energy Efficiency and Global Warming
Carbon dioxide is the principal anthropogenic cause of global
warming.13 6 As noted above, the rate of increase in carbon diox-
ide emissions of the industrialized countries of Western Europe
and North America decreased from about 3% per year in the pe-
riod 1945 to 1972 to less than 1% per year in the period 1973 to
1984. Carbon dioxide emissions from developing countries, 'on
the other hand, are increasing at a rate of 6% per year.' 37
The rate of growth of global carbon emissions has also declined
since 1973. Fully one-third of the drop, or about 1.1 billion tons
of carbon, can be traced to the decreasing energy intensity of
many national economies, that is, to increases in energy effi-
ciency. The rising use of renewable and nuclear sources of en-
ergy played a smaller but still significant role in the decline. If the
global expansion of emissions had continued at the pre-1973 rate,
annual emissions today would be almost 3 billion tons higher.'3 8
While world carbon emissions increased from roughly 2.6 bil-
lion tons in 1960 to 5.6 billion tons in 1987, the efficiency with
which carbon-containing sources of energy were used (measured
here in carbon emissions per dollar GNP) increased markedly
during the same period. Thus, whereas 411 grams of carbon per
dollar GNP were released in 1960, this figure decreased to 327
grams per dollar in 1987.13 9 The impact of improved energy effi-
ciency would have been much greater, however, had the consider-
able gains in energy efficiency not largely bypassed the
developing world. For example, the United States, the United
Kingdom, West Germany, and France all realized a decrease in
carbon emissions per dollar GNP averaging 173.5 grams from
1960 to 1987. During that same period, however, the carbon
136. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") estimates the ex-
pected contribution of carbon dioxide to the radiative forcing of climate change to be
611%. (The contributions of methane and nitrous oxide are, respectively, 17% and 4%.)
These figures are derived by multiplying the 1990 emissions rate for each gas by its
"Global Warming Potential," an index based upon such factors as the lifetime of the gas in
the atmosphere, its molecular weight, the position and strength of the absorption bands of
the gas, and the time period over which climate effects are of concern - in this calculation,
100 years. Thus, while carbon dioxide is "weak" relative to the other greenhouse gases if
one measures radiative forcing on a molecule-per-molecule or kilogram-per-kilogram ba-
sis, these comparisons underestimate the influence of carbon dioxide on global warming.
See IPCC REPORT, supra note 32, at 45-49, 61, Table 2.9. See generally id. chs. 1-2.
137. See id. at 10.
138. Flavin, supra note 27, at 18-19.
139. Id. at 19, Table 2-1.
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emissions of India, Nigeria, Mexico, and Egypt increased on the
average by 206 grams per dollar GNP.' 40
Enormous disparities among nations persist. In 1987, Japan
emitted only 156 grams of carbon per dollar GNP; the United
States released 276 grams of carbon per dollar GNP; Poland emit-
ted 492 grams of carbon per GNP; Mexico, 609; India, 655; and
China, an astounding 2024 grams of carbon per dollar of GNP. 14 '
Energy efficiency alone does not account for these disparities.
The composition of primary energy sources relied upon by a
country also plays a significant role in the measurement of carbon
emissions per unit of GNP. Carbon emissions per unit of energy,
even among the fossil fuels, varies greatly. Natural gas is the
cleanest fossil fuel in terms of carbon emissions; oil contains
about 44% more carbon per unit of energy than natural gas; coal,
about 75% more. 42 China's enormous carbon emissions level
per GNP is thus due in part to its heavy dependency on coal,
which accounted for 76% of China's primary energy consumption
in 1989.143 France, by contrast, emitted only 133 grams of car-
bon per dollar GNP in 1987, an amount lower than even highly
efficient Japan. 44 This is explained in part by France's decision
to encourage nuclear energy as a source of supply. Nuclear en-
ergy in 1989 contributed just under 30% to the total primary en-
ergy consumption in France. 145
Energy efficiency improvements, however, have the immediate
potential to reduce fossil fuel consumption in industrialized na-
tions by at least 3% annually.' 46 Global implementation of en-
ergy efficiency measures from 1990 to 2010 could account for a 3
billion ton difference in the amount of carbon released into the
140. Calculations based on id. Note also that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
energy intensities remained essentially unchanged in the same period because both indus-
tries and consumers were insulated from the market incentives and pressures that induced
energy efficiency gains elsewhere. Soviet per capita carbon emissions were almost two
times the level of Western Europe, yet per capita economic output was only two-thirds that
of Western Europe. Id. at 19-20.
141. Id. at 19, Table 2-1.
142. Id. at 22.
143. Calculation based on BRrrIsH PETROLEUM COMPANY, supra note 38, at 34.
144. Flavin, supra note 27, at 19, Table 2-1.
145. BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY, supra note 38, at 34.
146. Flavin, supra note 27, at 23.
1992]
128 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:93
atmosphere each year. 147 Such widespread application of energy
efficient technologies will be more likely if governments help cre-
ate economic incentives - by increasing the cost of using fossil
fuels, decreasing the price of clean, renewable sources of energy,
or both. Policies that accomplish this result through taxes or per-
mitting systems are an especially good strategy. 4 8 They create
appropriate incentives while leaving considerable flexibility to the
marketplace. Several governments in European countries have
proposed or enacted legislation providing for a tax on carbon di-
oxide emissions. 149
Because industrialized countries are the largest consumers of
energy, the total amount of energy saved by the implementation
of energy efficiency measures, and the commensurate reduction
in carbon emissions, will be greater in industrialized countries
than elsewhere. Developing nations, however, have much to gain
from increased energy efficiency, since they are the least efficient
consumers of energy and the least efficient users of carbon-inten-
sive energy. 150 Developed and developing countries alike should
welcome the decrease in carbon emissions produced by greater
efficiency in developing countries. Importantly, as explained be-
low, increasing energy efficiency in developing countries also de-
stroys the link between energy consumption and development.
For these reasons, increased energy efficiency should not be lim-
ited to the industrialized world.
147. Id. This estimate assumes a 3% annual rate of energy efficiency improvement, a
rate that Flavin believes feasible with the implementation of currently available efficiency
measures.
148. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 1, at 178-88 (discussing the benefits of permit-
ting systems).
149. See Flavin, supra note 27, at 33. The Netherlands, for example, has instituted a
system combining a general fuel charge, levied as an excise on petroleum fuels, natural
gas, liquefied petroleum gas, coal, and coke, with a rebate program whereby industries
receive a rebate or credit for undertaking approved pollution abatement activities. The
revenues generated by this system finance the majority of the government's environmental
programs. See NATURAL ENDOWMENTS, supra note 11, at 22 (citing OECD, ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTORATE, THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: DRAFT FINAL REPORT (June 1988)). The commission
of the European Community has recently indicated that it plans to submit a formal propo-
sal for a Community-wide energy tax. Half of the tax would be in the form of a general
levy on energy generation and half would be based on the carbon content of a given fuel.
Commission Asked to Make Formal Proposal on Energy Tax to Address Climate Change, 14 Int'l Envt.
Rep. (BNA) 670 (Dec. 18, 1991).
150. See LEAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 118; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note
122, at 47, Table 30.
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4. Energy Efficiency and Developing Countries
Without energy efficiency technologies, developing nations
would require increasingly greater levels of energy consumption
in order to support their desire to industrialize, achieve a higher
standard of living, and accommodate a growing population. The
potential gains from energy efficiency in developing nations can
be viewed as a sort of future energy source. The key virtue of
energy efficiency is that it promotes economic growth in a way
that simultaneously allows for environmental protection and en-
ergy conservation. At the same time, these technologies might
ultimately increase independence, allowing developing nations to
become more autonomous of the developed world.
Of course, wide variations exist among developing countries
with respect to the composition of energy supply, the level and
kind of energy services available, and the extent of any infrastruc-
ture and distribution network now in place. Some energy effi-
ciency technologies developed for application in industrialized
countries will be suitable for use in some developing countries
with only minor adjustments. Other developing nations will re-
quire strategies and technologies vastly different from those now
used in developed countries.
In impoverished areas of many developing countries, available
technologies could be employed to harness a much greater per-
centage of current energy input, providing larger amounts of usa-
ble energy to meet basic needs. Currently favored cooking
methods illustrate the present connection between poverty and
inefficient energy use. Cooking in earthen pots over an open fire
uses about eight times more energy than aluminum pots over a
gas stove.i 5i The distribution of aluminum pots, pressure
cookers, and fuel-efficient wood stoves would bring about signifi-
cant gains in energy efficiency.' 52 Fuel-efficient wood stoves have
been refined over traditionally employed models, using about half
as much firewood per year.' 53 The same $2 billion required to
finance the construction of a single nuclear power plant could in-
stead fund the construction of 200 to 400 million energy-efficient
stoves, at the current cost of $5 to $10 per stove - a number well
151. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 196.
152. Id.
153. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 256.
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in excess of that required to equip all of the urban and rural poor
households in India.154
In developing countries with more advanced economies and in-
frastructures, there are also large potential gains from energy effi-
ciency. In Brazil, for example, the electricity sector provides
numerous opportunities for efficiency improvements. Under the
guidance of a national electricity conservation -program
(PROCEL) established by the government in 1985, many of these
have been or are being implemented. A detailed study completed
in 1984 helped provide impetus for the government undertaking.
It indicated that for a total investment of $10 billion in more effi-
cient end-use technologies - such as refrigerators, street light-
ing, and motors - it would be feasible to defer construction of 22
gigawatts of new electrical supply capacity, which would have cost
an estimated $44 billion. 155
The energy savings to date have been substantial. By means of
a concerted installation effort in Brazil, for example, PROCEL has
led to the replacement of 280,000 incandescent street lights with
mercury vapor and high pressure sodium lamps, resulting in sav-
ings of around 115 gigawatt-hours ("GWh") per year.' 56 As of
1989, Brazil had realized overall savings of 1436 GWh per year
from end-use technologies adopted. 157 Such measures have al-
ready been responsible for lowering electricity demand in that
country by about 0.5 to 1.2% per year.' 58
Ample opportunities have been identified for future improve-
ments in Brazil. Audits of small and medium-sized industries and
commercial buildings conducted from 1987 to 1989 revealed
measures that could cut electricity use by an estimated 8 to
154. Id. at 364.
155. See Christopher Flavin, Electrifying the Third World, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1987, at
81, 88-89 (Lester R. Brown ed., Worldwatch Institute 1987).
156. Howard S. Geller & Jose R. Moreira, Brazil's National Electricity Conservation
Program (PROCEL): Progress and Lessons 5 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished paper, available
from American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Washington, D.C.). In addition,
the use of more efficient refrigerators contributed a total annual savings of 383 GWh as of
1989. Also as of 1989, the implementation of various other efficient lighting measures
resulted in a combined electricity savings of 644 GWh/year. Id. at 19, Table 3.
157. Id. at 19, Table 3. Saving 1070 to 2500 GWh/year in Brazil is equivalent to the
power typically supplied by 280 to 650 megawatts of hydroelectric capacity. Thus, with a
marginal cost of about $2000 per kilowatt, PROCEL has enabled utilities in Brazil to defer
investing $0.6 to 1.3 billion in new power plants, transmission lines, and distribution facili-
ties. Id. at 7-8.
158. Id. at 14.
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15%.159 If refrigerator and freezer manufacturers were to begin
producing only those models that achieved efficiency levels of the
best technology available in 1993, new refrigerators and freezers
would by 1998 consume approximately one-half as much electric-
ity as the average of models produced in 1990.160 The resulting
national energy savings by the year 2000 would be about 5100
GWh per year. 16 1
B. Beyond Efficiency: Alternative Energy Sources
For both developing and developed nations, the ultimate goal
ranges beyond energy efficiency to new technologies having mini-
mal adverse environmental consequences. Current efficiency
technologies can be seen as a transition stage before widespread
reliance on renewable energy sources and replacements for envi-
ronmentally harmful substances.' 62 Many possibilities now exist
for the use of renewable sources. Because of the complexity of
these issues, we provide only a brief outline here.
The principal renewable sources of energy include wind, bio-
mass, solar thermal, photovoltaic cells, and geothermal. These
sources now supply about 20% of the world's energy, and it has
been estimated that over half of U.S. energy use could be pro-
vided by renewables as early as 2030. Use of solar energy is espe-
cially promising, because solar rays are free, and because solar
energy avoids the majority of highly polluting effects of fossil fu-
els and other sources of energy. Today, solar thermal panels are
widely used to heat water in Cyprus, Israel, and Jordan, and a
solar energy company in California is now providing electricity to
homes at competitive prices.' 63
Photovoltaic cells, which convert sunlight directly into electric-
ity, have considerable potential. Technology should be available
to put these cells into general use within the next few decades,
and their cost is falling rapidly, from $30 per kilowatt-hour in
1971 to about 30 cents today. They can be used to accomplish all
of the tasks of fossil fuels. This technology is already in wide-
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id. at 6-7.
162. See OPPENHEIMER & BOYLE, supra note 4, at 175-206; COMMONER, supra note 116, at
191-243.
163. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 116, at 26-28.
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spread use in some rural areas in the Third World. In India, for
example, more than 6000 villages now use them.'6
There has been dramatic progress with other renewables as
well. Over the last decade wind power has fallen in price from 30
cents to 8 cents per kilowatt-hour, and wind-produced electricity
is now receiving considerable use in California. Northern Africa
and southern South America in particular could benefit from
wind power, using it in the short-term for more than 20% of their
energy. About a fifteenth of the world's electricity is now gener-
ated by hydropower, and there is considerable potential for
growth here as well. 165 Biomass energy is used - through primi-
tive technologies and with considerable environmental harm - to
provide over three-quarters of the energy for several countries in
Africa. 166 Though not strictly renewable, geothermal energy -
based on the heat of the earth's core - is used in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Kenya. 167
It is especially significant that developing nations frequently
have abundant supplies of renewable energy resources. Indeed,
one of the most attractive aspects of energy sources such as sun
and wind is that they are more equitably distributed on a global
basis than are the known fossil fuel reserves. These natural ad-
vantages remain insufficient, however, in the absence of proper
incentives, investment capital, and appropriate technology. It is
here that the international community might provide the neces-
sary assistance to develop renewable sources of energy.
The picture that emerges, then, is one in which enormous op-
portunities exist for enlisting energy efficiency and other technol-
ogies to improve the outlook for local and global energy
requirements, while simultaneously addressing environmental
and developmental problems. As mentioned above, the principal
advances in energy efficiency technologies have taken place in de-
veloped countries. If the potential gains from energy efficiency
are to be realized on a global level, the solutions must not avoid
164. Id. at 28.
165. See BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY, supra note 38, at 34; GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra
note 21, at 378-80. There are, however, environmental barriers to reliance on hydro-
power, which impairs conservation efforts. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 378-
80.
166. Here it is especially important to provide better and more efficient methods, be-
cause biomass places a severe stress on agTicultural resources. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL.,
supra note 21, at 226-31.
167. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 116, at 30.
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developing countries, especially in light of their grossly inefficient
practices and the local and global costs of their environmental
degradation. Ecological limitations and economic needs suggest
that developing nations should implement existing energy effi-
ciency technologies and encourage the development of means to
use alternative renewable sources of energy.
The question is, therefore, how to develop arrangements which
facilitate the worldwide use of energy technologies that limit or
reduce environmental degradation.
C. Technology-For-Nature Trades
We suggest an altogether novel kind of exchange. Developed
nations would transfer economically and environmentally sound
technologies to developing countries. In turn, the latter would
agree to protect natural resources. Specifically, the exchanges
would involve the transfer of energy technology from an industri-
alized country in return for a commitment from a developing na-
tion to stem deforestation and to protect biological diversity.
Trades of this kind would provide an exceptionally powerful
tool for promoting development in poor countries, while at the
same time contributing to the solution of local and global envi-
ronmental problems. For developing nations, they offer not
merely a minor reduction in debt, but an opportunity to ensure
that economic growth proceeds in an environmentally responsi-
ble manner. They would enable developing countries to avoid
becoming dependent on energy sources that have created so
many environmental problems for the industrialized world. At
the same time, they would save energy costs while permitting the
energy use that is indispensable to development. In short, trades
of technology for nature have greater long-term potential than
debt-for-nature swaps to accomplish all the relevant goals.
More specifically, the proposed exchange would yield dramatic
and long-term environmental and developmental benefits. It
would seek to improve upon the benefits to be gained from the
"debt" side of the debt-for-nature equation by transferring to the
developing nation something that provides not immediate, short-
term economic relief, but instead facilitates the recipient nation's
long-term economic growth and political and economic indepen-
dence. The transfer of energy technology in particular is
designed to take advantage of the enormous current opportuni-
ties for increasing energy efficiency, while allowing growth to re-
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main at least constant.16 8 These arrangements would enable the
recipient nation to become a more efficient consumer of energy,
regardless of the source, and therefore to increase the prospects
for economic development. These swaps could also facilitate the
research, development, and application of renewable sources of
energy particularly suited to the debtor country's needs. Impor-
tantly, such arrangements would contribute to the increase in
technological capacity and research infrastructure in the develop-
ing nation.
This reduced dependence on non-renewable sources of energy
would, in turn, increase the benefits on the nature side of the
equation. Diminished demands on, for example, wood from the
forests as a source of fuel would reduce deforestation, ideally to
the point of sustainable use. Economic pressures, moreover, that
overtax the natural resource base will be relieved in some mea-
sure, as less energy input will be required to produce a given level
of economic output, thereby freeing capital to be redirected to-
wards addressing the underlying causes of environmental degra-
dation. Moreover, the continued development and use of energy-
efficient technologies could reduce, on a worldwide basis, depen-
dence on environmentally harmful fossil fuels. Some developing
countries might eventually become exporters of efficient end-use
technology or of surplus electricity generated from renewable pri-
mary energy sources.
We propose a trade of technology for nature, but it is impor-
tant to point out that there are strong justifications for requiring
industrialized nations to transfer technology to developing coun-
tries for free. Such measures might be required under some ver-
sions of theories positing a right to access by all nations to the
universal heritage of technology. 169 They might also be justified
on the view that industrialized nations have incurred such a duty
because of their past and present irresponsible energy consump-
168. The idea here is that because developing nations use inefficient energy technolo-
gies, they have high energy intensities. The potential for a developing nation to reduce its
energy intensity by employing energy efficient technologies already in existence is there-
fore great, and can be viewed as a sort of future energy resource possessed in a dispropor-
tionate amount by developing nations. See supra part IV(A).
169. This right is asserted, for example, in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR Special Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Spe-
cial Sess., Agenda Item 7, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
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tion. 170 Measures to ensure that technological advances extend
to developing countries might be required as a quid pro quo for
demands that developing countries join international agreements
to limit environmentally harmful practices. 17  A grant of technol-
ogy might also be based on the view that the global need for tech-
nologies is in large part a function of environmental hazards
unleashed by productive forces from which industrialized nations
have disproportionately benefitted.
The argument for such a grant might be straightforwardly re-
distributive in character, referring to the extraordinary wealth of
some nations in comparison with others, the injustice of such
large disparities,172 and the moral duty of those who are in an
unjustly superior position to share their technological capacities
with others who need them. Finally, this view might be founded
on the idea that industrialized nations have a good deal to gain
from the development of improved energy technologies through-
out the world, namely, reduced aggregate pollution.
For present purposes, we take no position on these complex
questions. A principal difficulty with making technology freely
available is that it may diminish incentives to create the technol-
170. Statistics support this justification and underscore the inequity of current world
disparities in energy use: per capita oil consumption in the United States for snowmobiles
and recreational boats and vehicles, the equivalent of 1.6 GJ/year, is almost as much as per
capita oil use in India for all purposes, which is 1.8 GJ/year. GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra
note 21, at 191. The average citizen of Bangladesh consumes less than 1.5% of the energy
used by his or her United States counterpart. In especially striking terms, the energy con-
tent in the food eaten by an average North American is greater than the total energy used
by a Bangladeshi for all purposes. Id.
171. This view finds support, for example, in Principle 12 of the Declaration of the
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972) ("Resources should be made
available to preserve and improve the environment, taking into account . . . any costs
which may emanate from [developing countries] incorporating environmental safeguards
into their development planning and the need for making available to them, upon their
request, additional international technical and financial assistance for this purpose."). See
also EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENT LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT, FINAL REPORT OF THE EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON
LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(1986), reprinted in EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENT LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOP-
MENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35, 65-69 (1987) (Article 7 and accompa-
nying comment). For a discussion of requests made by India and China for transfers of
technology and capital assistance to offset the costs of adopting the alternatives to
chlorofluorocarbons necessary to meet the terms of the Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, see NATURAL ENDOWMENTS, supra note 11, at 22.
172. See generally THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1990).
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ogy in the first place. For this reason, one might expect govern-
ments in developed countries to provide compensation to
industries with the relevant technology, and then to ensure that
the technology is given to developing countries for free or for a
below-market price. Such an approach introduces some of the
complexities in a technology-for-nature trade. 73
1. Diffusion of Technology
There are many approaches for ensuring the dissemination of
energy technology throughout the developed and developing
world. Some argue that the diffusion of technology via market-
driven mechanisms should not be hampered by government poli-
cies and private practices inconsistent with ordinary free mar-
kets. 174 Others counter that the necessary global transition to
efficient and environmentally sound energy practices cannot be
instituted without some combination of interventionist devices,
such as technology transfer, subsidies, and loans to developing
countries. 175 Because the benefits of energy efficiency are not
fully internalized through markets, it seems clear that any sensible
strategy must employ a mixture of market and non-market ap-
proaches. In any case, we believe that an exchange of technology
for nature could play a significant role in any large-scale set of
initiatives for disseminating energy technology.
The transfer of technology from developed to developing
countries has historically elicited two principal objections. Both
objections turn out to be versions of the same fundamental con-
cern, namely, the possible insensitivity of transferors to the
unique situation and needs of each developing country.
The first objection is that technology developed for use in an
industrialized country may be ill-suited, and perhaps even harm-
ful, for use in a particular developing nation. This criticism is
based largely on experience in an era when most technology
transfers occurred only in conjunction with the sale of equipment
173. In discussing those complexities, and proposing such trades, we do not mean to
deny that a grant of technology might be desirable in some contexts. On the contrary,
many of the considerations that we explore bear on such grants as well.
174. For a summary of market imperfections and distortions particular to the energy
sector, and for a suggestion of reforms in national pricing policies, see GOLDEMBERG ET
AL., supra note 21, at 325-28, 339- 40.
175. See generally id. at 322-69.
Economics and the Environment
by private enterprises from industrialized nations. 176 This sort of
transfer is not representative of the broad array of technology
transfers possible,77 nor of the transfers that we envision. None-
theless, the criticism provides an important warning: parties to a
technology transfer must ensure the suitability of the technology
for the recipient country.
This seemingly obvious requirement might easily be over-
looked. The tendency to assume that technological advancement
is tantamount to increased consumption, and that the needs of
the developing countries replicate those of the developed world
at an earlier stage in its industrialization, might lead to the crea-
tion of programs with perverse effects. The problem here is not
only the opportunity costs of the misdirected resources but also
the exacerbation of existing problems in the developing country.
Thus, for example, a transfer that involves technology encourag-
ing centralized energy supply systems might add to an already
overcrowded urban population concentration. It may also con-
tribute to the entrenching of the "dual society" of many develop-
ing countries, as the urban elite approach the consumption
patterns of developed countries while the needs of the rural poor
are not addressed.178
Another example of inappropriate technology exacerbating ex-
isting problems involves transfers that are insensitive to the effect
of the new technology in displacing economic activity. Transfer
of certain technologies to countries with high unemployment can
be destructive if they contribute to that problem and fail to capi-
talize on the abundance of labor.' 79 This is a special concern in
light of the fact that some advanced technology is especially
176. See David Dichter & Klaus Netter, A New Look at Foreign Investment, in UNITED NA-
TIONs DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., DEVELOPMENT FORUM (Sept.-Oct. 1988) ("Early in the post-
colonial period, the most significant technology transfers were made to developing coun-
tries by subsidiaries of [transnational corporations] .... No special considerations were
made of Third World differences.... Important technical information was withheld from
recipient countries.").
177. Id.
178. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 219-21. In India, for example, about
88% of rural households depend entirely on kerosene for their lighting needs, and while
the number of unelectrified villages is decreasing, the number of unelectrified homes is
increasing. Id. at 258-60.
179. In the Indian state of Karnataka, in 1978 to 1979, 20 industries consumed nearly
69% of the state's electricity output and contributed less than 8% of industrial employ-
ment (18,270 people), whereas about 615 other industries consumed about 31% of elec-
tricity output and employed 217,027 people. Id. at 223-24 & Table 3.14.
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adapted for large, energy-intensive, labor-saving industries rather
than smaller, labor-intensive industries. 80
The second common objection to technology transfer is that
some forms of transfer perpetuate the dependence of developing
countries rather than encouraging their long-term self-reliance
and genuine growth. In the area of energy technology, this criti-
cism arose in response to past development aid projects, which
were often conceived, constructed, and managed by policy mak-
ers, engineers, and consultants from the developed world.' 8'
When these workers returned to their developed countries, any
expertise and experience gained in the process was also effec-
tively repatriated. The project left a new generating facility, for
example, in the developing nation, but contributed little to its ac-
quisition of human technical capacity or to the foundations of a
research infrastructure.
This objection points to the same remedy as the first. Participa-
tion and involvement on the part of the developing country, in-
cluding its researchers and NGOs, is crucial in all stages of the
project, from conception to implementation. The substance and
shape of the project should be a product of both nations, rather
than dictated by one to another. Transfer arrangements that take
the form of a joint research effort between developed and devel-
oping countries probably best accommodate this concern.
The response to both criticisms, then, is not that technology
should never be transferred, but instead that transfer arrange-
ments should be crafted so as to observe the imperative of local
involvement in all cases. Transfers should, moreover, be fash-
ioned with an eye toward achieving long-term technological self-
reliance, and thus stability and growth, for developing nations.
2. Exchanging Technology for Nature •
The concept of an exchange or trade of energy technology for
nature encompasses a broad array of arrangements. Exchanges
falling under this heading might occur, for example, in the con-
text of intergovernmental agreements concerning environment
and development. In this case one or both sides of the bargain -
that is, the commitment to transfer technology or the commit-
ment to promote environmental protection - might be under-
180. See id. at 223.
181. SeeJoannides, supra note l1, at 175-76.
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taken in fulfillment of a party's obligations under the terms of an
existing intergovernmental agreement.' 82
Technology-for-nature exchanges might also be initiated by
NGOs, wholly outside of any intergovernmental commitments.
These would resemble the debt-for-nature arrangements cur-
rently in place. Finally, some versions of the proposed exchange
might involve a hybrid. For example, a developing country might
undertake specific measures .under an international convention
concerning the sustainable use of forests. These measures may
be considered to fulfill its obligations under the nature side of the
proposed exchange, while the technology side might be arranged
outside of any governmental obligation to provide the
technology.
In discussing the proposed exchange of technology for nature,
we do not attempt to describe all of the possible arrangements
and actors. Indeed, it would be a mistake to saddle the parties
with a rigid formula. We seek instead to set forth the basic frame-
work and to encourage the parties involved to fashion appropri-
ately the contours of the arrangements.
a. The Parties: Roles and Interests
The roles and interests of some of the parties would be similar
to those in current debt-for-nature swaps,183 but some additional
182. There is great potential for the proposed exchanges to serve as a vehicle for trans-
lating the language of such international obligations into forceful commitments. This
function is likely to be increasingly critical as international agreements contemplate com-
prehensive approaches to the concerns of environment and development, and as provi-
sions for technology transfer and other forms of cooperation between developed and
developing nations move from the realm of principle to that approaching legal obligation.
Consider, in this regard, the provision for technology transfer in Article 5 of the amended
Montreal Protocol, supra note 6, 26 I.L.M. at 1555-56, and the importance of this provision
in securing the signature of such countries as India, see French, supra note 8, at 160-61;
consider also the movement from the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment ("UNCHE"), supra note 171, to the 1992 United Nations Conference on En-
vironment and Development, see Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/61 (1991), and from the inclu-
sion of Principle 12 in the Stockholm Declaration resulting from UNCHE, mentioning the
need for "international ... technical assistance," REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON THE HUMAN ENvIRONMENT, supra note 171, at 4, to the anticipated inclusion in
some of the international agreements resulting from the latter of specific provisions for
technology transfer.
183. The basic parties to the proposed exchanges would likely include: a sponsoring
international environmental group or other international broker (perhaps an international
NGO with expertise in energy policy); a source of technology and possibly researchers
from the developed country; an energy organization or project, including researchers, in
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parties, and new roles for existing ones, would become necessary
in at least some technology-for-nature exchanges.
As we envision it, the international broker - probably an in-
ternational NGO or group of NGOs with experience in the areas
of energy and environment - would often orchestrate the trans-
action. Regardless of the source of the project's initial impetus,
the broker would perform the important function of identifying
appropriate participants, particularly in the developing country.
Ideally, the broker would itself be a cooperative effort between
organizations from the developed and developing country. The
interests of such a broker should be connected to the mutually
advantageous results to be brought about by completion of the
exchange.
Yet this alignment alone might not be sufficient to warrant the
large investment of effort demanded of the broker by the com-
plexity of the transaction. In addition to the interests common to
all participants in the exchange, the international organization
must see that there will be significant benefits over alternative
uses of its resources. This criterion is likely to be met, however,
because of the distinctive interplay of gains in the related areas of
energy conservation, economic development, and environmental
protection resulting from technology-for-nature trades. These
gains are not as obvious or as readily quantifiable as the leverag-
ing of conservation dollars, which provides the impetus for orga-
nizational participation in debt-for-nature transactions. But the
return on a broker's investment is potentially far-reaching and
great. In addition, governments may well enlist the services and
expertise of such organizations in order to fulfill obligations for
technology transfer or technological resource contribution under
the terms of international agreements. NGOs may therefore be
able in some cases to secure funding from governmental sources.
An NGO from the developing country, particularly one with an
energy focus, might perform several critical functions. Regardless
of whether it is active in the overall orchestration as the broker, it
might play an important role as counterpart to the developed
country NGO in conceptualizing the project and identifying ap-
propriate participants from its country or region. As experience
the developing country; the government of the developing country; and a developing
country conservation organization. The arrangement would also likely require participa-
tion by the developed country government or, perhaps, by bilateral or multilateral aid
agencies.
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in the debt-for-nature context has shown, much of the success of
the exchange depends on local involvement at each stage in the
process from inception to implementation. 84 The developing
country NGO might itself be involved in energy research, or it
might be concerned with energy and environmental issues. Both
types of NGO would be capable of combining the necessary
knowledge of local conditions and needs with the ability to solicit
local researchers.
The developing country NGO might in some cases be made re-
sponsible for any training and educational activities created to en-
sure dissemination and implementation of the technology. Such
a system would presumably serve the interests of the organization
on several fronts. It would provide the means for the immediate
realization of improvements in meeting energy requirements for
development, strengthen local technological and research capac-
ity,' and create progress toward long-term economic health and
environmental viability.
The developing country government would participate in a
technology-for-nature exchange in much the same capacity as in
the debt-for-nature context. Additional facets to this participa-
tion would likely be required as a result of government involve-
ment in the energy sector.
The interests of the developing country in furthering economic
development and environmental aims would be well served by
such a transaction. Indeed, as discussed above, the potential for
mutually reinforcing gains from a comprehensive approach is crit-
ical to the realization of either goal. The developing country gov-
ernment should welcome the opportunity to redirect the financial
resources that otherwise would have been used to increase energy
supply to meet growing demands. Indeed, such resources could
be devoted to the conservation programs undertaken as part of
the technology-for-nature transaction. In some cases, the devel-
oping country government may become better able to fulfill its
obligations under international environmental agreements,
thereby increasing the likelihood of observance by developed na-
tions of the same agreements.
It is conceivable that such arrangements could occur without
participation from the government of the developed country.
The addition of that government to the cast would, however, be
184. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
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highly beneficial, primarily in order to provide incentives to those
conducting research in energy technology. Indeed, such ex-
changes might not be feasible without the involvement of these
governments. The funding required may often exceed the re-
sources of private organizations, and private industry has little in-
centive to participate independently in technology transfers at
below-market prices. Developed country governments could "pro-
vide tax incentives or subsidies, or establish an award program for
researchers who develop technology for transfer or who other-
wise cooperate with researchers in a developing nation. The de-
veloped country could also procure technology directly in order
to influence the market in the direction of efficient and renewable
energy technologies. Finally, the government might engage in re-
search on its own, with the idea that the fruits of such research
would not only be employed in the home country but also be
available for transfer to developing nations.
Governments of industrialized countries might be interested in
participating in such transactions as part of their development aid
programs, on concessional terms, or for free. In any of these
cases, the proposed technology-for-nature exchange offers
greater opportunities than debt-for-nature agreements for return
on their investment, for the same reasons that it offers this oppor-
tunity to the brokers of the transaction. In addition, obligations
for technology transfer and scientific cooperation are likely to be
included in an increasing number of intergovernmental agree-
ments. The arrangement we propose would furnish a useful
mechanism for meeting these obligations. The proposed ex-
change would also increase the likelihood that the provisions of
such agreements will be - and can be - observed by developing
countries.
b. The Commitments: Nature and Technology
It is difficult and perhaps unwise to attempt to specify the sub-
stance of the commitments of the proposed exchange in a vac-
uum, that is, removed geographically, culturally, and temporally
from the particular context of the exchange. As is evident from
the wide range of environmental commitments selected by the
parties to the various debt-for-nature swaps,' 85 the needs of the
parties will vary greatly from country to country or from project
185. See supra part III(A).
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to project. Indeed, it is this flexibility, and the potential for the
parties to fashion appropriate variations, that constitutes one of
the strengths of these arrangements as a tool for serving the in-
terests of all involved.
Nevertheless, we offer a few suggestions of the sorts of commit-
ments that might be suitable for technology-for-nature ex-
changes. In particular, we identify some of the energy
technologies that might be the subject of such exchanges. In so
doing, we draw upon a recent but growing body of work being
done in this area, in both developed and developing countries. 186
In the process of describing the mechanics of debt-for-nature
swaps, we have mentioned some of the commitments that might
be undertaken on the nature side of the transaction.' 8 7 The pos-
sibilities for this portion of the proposed technology-for-nature
transaction would be similarly numerous and limited only by the
requirements of the individual parties.
In the process of describing the potential for energy efficiency,
we have also touched on some of the technologies that might be
appropriate in some areas.' 8 Efficient wood stoves, for example,
could be widely employed in countries that rely on wood to meet
basic cooking needs. Similarly, projects like those undertaken in
Brazil might be appropriate in other countries where a similarly
developed infrastructure exists,' 8 9 where governments have be-
186. See, e.g., GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21 (United States, Sweden, India, Brazil);
MICHAEL PHILIPS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION, ENERGY CONSER-
VATION ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Sept. 1990) (Ivory Coast, Senegal,
Tunisia, Egypt, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Turkey); MICHAEL PHILIPS, INTERNATIONAL IN-
STITUTE FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION, ENERGY CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES IN ASIA (Sept.
1990) (China, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan) [hereinafter CONSER-
VATION IN ASIA]; MICHAEL PHILIPS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION,
ENERGY CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (June 1990)
(Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Jamaica) [hereinafter CONSERVATION IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN]; Geller & Moreira, supra note 156 (noting the potential for
energy conservation in Brazil). Many possibilities for energy efficiency have been identi-
fied in various studies and reports by the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program
("ESMAP"), many of which are discussed in MICHAEL PHILIPS, INTERNATIONAL INSTTrrUTE
FOR ENERGY CONSERVATION, ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN END-USE ENERGY EFFICIENCY (Oct. 1990) (Working Draft).
187. See supra part I1(A).
188. See supra part IV(A)(4).
189. Projects successful in India are often emulated by other developing countries.
TATA ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE & INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY CONSERVA-
TION, PROPOSAL TO INITIATE PLANNING FOR A Low CFC, HIGH EFFICIENCY REFRIGERATOR
FOR MANUFACTURE IN INDIA 1 (Oct. 1990) (unpublished paper, available from the IIEC.
Washington, D.C.). Dissemination of technology via this route, from one developing
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gun to understand the benefits of pursuing demand-side or end-
use planning over purely supply-side planning for their countries'
increasing energy needs, and where various organizations are
demonstrating an interest in cooperating in such programs.
190
Efficient end-use technologies for lighting, refrigeration, and
transportation are but a few of the likely candidates for such
exchanges.
The task for the parties to transfers involving these or similar
technologies is to design and implement distribution networks,
and to conduct necessary informational and educational activities
in order to ensure dissemination of the relevant technology. Any
modification necessary to tailor such technologies to the area in
which they will be implemented could be undertaken primarily by
local engineers familiar with the area's people and culture, work-
ing jointly with engineers from the developed country.
More challenging arrangements, with potentially greater long-
term benefits, include the establishment of joint research efforts
for the development of competitive applications of renewable
sources of energy. One arrangement likely to prove fruitful in
this decade would involve cooperative research and development
of photovoltaic solar cell technology. This type of solar technol-
ogy directly converts energy from the sun into electricity, bypas-
sing mechanical conversion processes. As a result, it is well-
suited for use in large electricity plants as well as small water
pumps and rural communications systems.' 9' This technology is
especially promising for the electrification of the widely dispersed
villages of many developing countries, where systems requiring
centralized plants and a matrix of extended power lines are less
&esirable.' 92, At present, photovoltaics are too expensive for
widespread use, but scientists believe that advances will enable
costs to be significantly reduced by the end of the decade. 9 3
country to another, is important and valuable for a number of reasons beyond simply en-
suring the spread of technologies useful for environment and development goals. Indeed,
the IIEC's "model country program" approach is designed to encourage developing coun-
tries to take advantage of this dynamic. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY CONSER-
VATION, MODEL COUNTRY PROJECT TO IMPLEMENT ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THAILAND I
(undated and unpublished paper, available from IIEC, Washington, D.C.).
190. See supra part IV(A)(4); CONSERVATION IN ASIA, supra note 186; CONSERVATION IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 186.
191. See Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 116, at 28.
192. See id. at 27 & Table 2-3; GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 234.
193. Flavin & Lenssen, supra note 116, at 28.
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Cooperative endeavors could draw upon ongoing efforts and
resources in both developing and developed countries to further
refine these technologies. 94  Such joint research initiatives
should be structured so as to emphasize the facilitation of long-
term local technological capability, with the ultimate aim of estab-
lishing or strengthening the developing country's infrastructure
for research, development, production, and distribution.195
From this description, it should be clear that, as in the debt-for-
nature context, the proposed exchanges would involve a fairly
complex constellation of actors. Technology-for-nature ex-
changes would, however, also share the best feature of their debt-
for-nature predecessors: all of the potential actors stand to gain
from the successful conclusion of the arrangement. Although the
parties to technology-for-nature exchanges are numerous, the
close interrelation of their goals should go a long way toward as-
suring the cooperation necessary to structure and execute such
transactions.
D. Legal Reforms
To some extent, technology-for-nature exchanges could be un-
dertaken without legal reforms. No statutory change is necessary
194. Cooperative efforts would also be fruitful with other renewable sources of energy
supply, particularly in light of the mutual benefits attainable from collaboration with those
developing countries geographically well-situated for research into technologies that har-
ness a particular source of energy, such as wind energy. These countries may already have
accumulated knowledge and valuable experience for the development of a particular tech-
nology. See GOLDEMBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 384-89 (discussing experience in the
development of wind power in various locations, including the State of Karnataka, in
India).
195. A recent initiative taken by the IIEC in joint technology development of efficient,
CFC-free refrigerators for manufacture in India, is illustrative of an approach involving
collaboration between developed and developing countries with the ultimate goal of en-
hancing the developing country's independence. This example provides a model readily
adaptable to cooperative efforts in the development of renewable energy technology. The
IIEC is working on the project with the New Delhi-based Tata Energy Research Institute
("TERI"), which will involve participants from the refrigerator industry, research institu-
tions, and governmental agencies from both the United States and India. The IIEC and
TERI intend to perform oversight functions throughout the development phase of the
project, but to end their involvement when the project becomes commercially viable. This
exemplary project will thus increase Indian experience in research and development of
this technology and result in the production and use in India of an efficient, environmen-
tally sound refrigerator. See TATA ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 189, at 1-4.
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to enable private parties to engage in such arrangements. 9 6 The
requisite participation by national governments may be author-
ized by existing statutes.
There would be large advantages, however, in national and in-
ternational legal and policy reforms designed to facilitate these
exchanges. At a minimum, this would require the elimination, by
the national governments of both developed and developing
countries, of laws and policies that are inhospitable to the re-
search and development of energy efficiency technology, and to
the transfer of that technology.' 9 7 Government intervention, at
the least, must not disturb market incentives favoring conserva-
tion and innovation. Toward that objective, pricing policies for
the energy sector must be recrafted so that prices accurately re-
flect the full costs of using energy - particularly that provided by
fossil fuels - and take account of environmental and other
externalities. 9 8
Reforms might also include measures that more actively pursue
implementation of technology-for-nature exchanges. Recent ini-
tiatives at the domestic level are extremely promising. The
Global Environmental Protection Assistance Act of 1989, for ex-
ample, instructs the United States representative to the Develop-
ment Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") to initiate efforts by
that body to coordinate approaches to global warming, tropical
196. As experience in the context of debt-for-nature exchanges has demonstrated, it is
indeed nongovernmental organizations, rather than governmental entities, that are likely
to pioneer endeavors involving such novel arrangements. See supra part III(A).
197. For developed countries, this could require the abandonment of policies that skew
incentives for energy research and development, biasing them in favor of continued fossil
fuel dependence. In the United States, for example, $2.3 billion is slated for "clean coal"
research during the next five years. See Flavin, supra note 27, at 27. Some developing
countries might consider developing or strengthening a regime protecting intellectual
property, in order to facilitate some types of transfer of technology and to encourage local
innovation. See Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 75 (1990).
198. See generally PACE UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL STUDIES, ENVI-
RONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY (1990). For recent suggestions for including environ-
mental costs in accounting systems, see ERNST.LUTZ & SALAH EL SERAFY, ENVIRONMENTAL
AND RESOURCE ACCOUNTING: AN OVERVIEW (World Bank, Environment Department
Working Paper No. 6, 1988); HENRY M. PESKIN, ACCOUNTING FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DE-
PLETION AND DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (World Bank, Environment Depart-
ment Working Paper No. 13, 1989); HENRY M. PESKIN & ERNST LUTz, A SURVEY OF
RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (World Bank,
Environment Department Working Paper No. 37, 1990).
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deforestation, sustainable development, and biological diversity
through bilateral aid programs. 99 Among the goals of these pro-
grams is the "improved exchange of information on energy effi-
ciency and solar and renewable energy sources, and a greater
emphasis on the use of those sources in development
projects." 200 To carry out this goal, the transfer of technology to
developing countriies seems indispensable.
Legislation that specifically envisages technology-for-nature ex-
changes, providing for both initiatives and the funding to carry
them out, would be welcome. Legislation of this sort could repli-
cate the provisions of section 711 of the Global Environmental
Protection Assistance Act, 20 ' which gives such authority, in the
context of debt-for-nature exchanges, to the Agency for Interna-
tional Development ("AID"). AID might similarly be empowered
to initiate the transactions necessary for a technology-for-nature
exchange, to purchase technology from industry and other
sources, and to undertake negotiations with the various parties
involved, including the developing country government. 20 2
At the international level, there is a pressing need for coordi-
nated measures to protect against environmental degradation
while ensuring that such protection does not come at the expense
of economic growth. To this end, we mention here three points.
First, international legal instruments must, by their terms, recog-
nize the interrelation between environmental protection and
global economic health. Treaties and protocols are an important
step, but to date they have been partial and ad hoc.2 0 3 We ap-
plaud the recent recognition - by provision for and preparations
leading to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
199. The Global Environmental Protection Assistance Act of 1989 comprises Title VII
of the International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, §§ 711,
721-22, 103 Stat. 2492, 2521-24 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2281-86 (Supp. 1 1989)).
200. Id. § 722(6), 103 Stat. at 2523-24.
201. Id. § 711, 103 Stat. at 2521-23 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2281-86 (Supp. 1 1989)).
202. AID was suggested as a promising candidate for orchestrating such exchanges by
Howard S. Geller, the Executive Director of the American Council for an Energy Efficient
Economy, in part because AID possesses some expertise gained from past participation in
energy efficiency projects in developing countries. Telephone interview with Howard S.
Geller (Jan. 24, 1991).
203. For discussion of the successes and failures of recent efforts to address concerns of
environmental protection and sustainable development through international conven-
tions, see Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change: An Over-
view of the International Legal Process, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 271-83 (1990);
Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1521-79
(1991).
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Development2 0 4 - of the need to address developmental exigen-
cies if progress in worldwide environmental protection is to be
achieved. International agreements, however, must also facilitate
the translation of this recognition into practice. In light of the
complexity of the underlying causes of the problem, many of
which lie outside of the traditional ambit of intergovernmental
agreements addressing environmental concerns, accomplishment
of this task will require agreements that encourage and establish a
framework for innovative international cooperative efforts.
Second, it would be extremely valuable to position an interna-
tional entity, perhaps operating through the United Nations, to
facilitate cooperation among developing and developed countries
toward the realization of sustainability. 20 5 Such an entity might
be charged with the missions of encouraging appropriate energy
use in the pursuit of economic growth and environmental protec-
tion. It could also provide a much needed base for coordinating
the various projects undertaken by the diverse groups already in-
volved in efforts in the interrelated areas of energy, environment,
and development. 20 6 An important function of such an entity
would be the establishment of standards for energy efficiency and
technology transfer. The entity could operate as a clearinghouse
for information on past and contemplated transactions, and could
make recommendations for long-term solutions. Finally, such an
entity should be structured and located in such a way as to assure
maximum accessibility by developing countries. To this end, a
system with connected regional branches seems preferable to a
single centralized bureau.
Third, mechanisms should be created to ensure that any agree-
ments, whether they involve debt relief or technology transfer,
are enforceable. At the very least, the relevant exchanges should
probably be subject to enforcement in the national courts of the
developing country. This approach would weaken claims about
204. See G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 151, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989).
205. It is not clear whether the necessary responsibilities ought to be located in an ex-
isting entity of the U.N. or an entirely new entity. Both options have advantages and disad-
vantages, and we do not take a position on their relative merits.
206. Under the auspices of the United Nations alone, a formidable number of pro-
grams, specialized agencies, and other entities share responsibility for economic develop-
ment, appropriate energy use, and environmental protection. See CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WORLD DIRECTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 33-45 (Thad-
deus C. Trzyna ed., 3d ed. 1989).
Economics and the Environment
intrusions on sovereignty. Alternatively, arbitration clauses in
these agreements might allow enforcement of any arbitral award
in any country that is a party to the United Nations Convention
on Arbitration. 20 7 Finally, the .coordinating entity that we have
proposed might be given monitoring and adjudicative functions.
One or more of these approaches might be necessary to resolve
problems that will likely increase in magnitude with the prolifera-
tion of environmental agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
In the next generation, development in poor countries presents
a crucial challenge for environmental law and policy. Many such
countries have little incentive to engage in environmental protec-
tion at all. All of them need assurance that the relevant programs
are designed in a way that does not unduly compromise, and ide-
ally promotes, the goals of development and political and eco-
nomic independence.
Central to the realization of sustainable development will be
the employment, on a worldwide basis, of strategies for efficient
energy use. To achieve this goal, it will be necessary to create
techniques to increase the efficiency of existing energy sources
and ultimately to convert to new sources having fewer harmful
environmental consequences. Both developing nations and their
industrialized counterparts should promote the development and
implementation of the necessary technology.
There is much to be said in favor of strategies that promote
environmental protection and economic development by reduc-
ing the debt obligations currently burdening many developing
nations. Suitably structured, debt-for-nature trades should ac-
complish considerable good. Standing alone, however, these
strategies do far too little to address the need for efficient and
alternative energy technology, which is the long-term prerequisite
for the economic and ecological stability of developing nations.
To be sure, there is a pressing need to alleviate the debt burdens
under which developing countries currently labor. But economic
recovery and growth will also be hastened by directing resources
toward strategies designed to put these countries on the long-
term path to sustainability. The channelling of funds toward in-
207. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1970).
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creasing energy efficiency will thus be an important area for in-
vesting resources over the next decades. New technologies,
permitting the replacement of fossil fuels with clean and renewa-
ble sources of energy, are the ultimate goal of environmental and
energy policy in developing and developed nations alike.
In light of these considerations, we have proposed an entirely
new kind of agreement: the technology-for-nature exchange.
This exchange has considerable advantages over its debt-for-na-
ture prototype. Its major advantage is that it promises to bring
about large-scale, long-term reform and thus to create structures
for encouraging not only lower cost economic development, but
also the production of energy by means creating minimal damage
to the environment. In its ideal form, it will also advance pro-
gress in energy efficiency, an area that is vital to sustainable devel-
opment. In these ways, a decision to trade technology for nature
holds out far more promise than previously contemplated
strategies.
The proposed exchange raises some serious economic and eth-
ical questions, and it is also fairly complex. For instance, devel-
oped countries may well be under an ethical obligation to transfer
technology to developing countries for free or at significant re-
ductions in price. This obligation might be justified by reference
to general redistributive goals, environmental concerns, or the
view that industrialized countries have profited from technologi-
cal development producing environmental harms, that such coun-
tries benefit from environmental protection in developing
countries, and that developing countries should not be placed
under special economic disabilities because of environmental
damage caused by others. These considerations suggest that at
least a heavily discounted transfer of technology may be an ethical
obligation of developed countries. Whether or not this is so, a
transfer of technology for nature seems to hold out considerable
promise.
A transfer of technology for nature requires the cooperation of
several parties, all of whom wish to advance different agendas.
The arrangement we propose should serve the interests of each
party, and the resulting advances in combatting global environ-
mental and developmental problems should benefit all con-
cerned. To some extent such transactions could occur without
legal changes, but international and domestic law could both be
harnessed to facilitate the process. Technology-for-nature ex-
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changes could contribute enormously to resolution of the closely
linked problems of environmental protection and economic
development.

